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Abstract 
As a consequence of the pervasiveness of traditional culture, Mao’s cult 
originated from the absolutely anti-religious environment during the early 
period of modern China. As a response to the modernization in today’s China, 
Mao’s cult has became a new tradition and evolved into a modern mode of 
Chinese popular religion, as well as non-religious patriotism, the legitimacy of 
the CCP, and Chinese national cohesion. That is to say, the tradition itself was 
created in the context of modernity, and both tradition and modernity possess 
only a kind of relative connotation. Therefore, the revival of Mao’s cult in 
today’s China, in the religious form or non-religious form, manifests the 
traditional Chinese culture persisting in the modern development of China, and 
thereby constructs a unique Chinese model of modern development --- an 
alternative modernity in other words. Therefore the western model might not 
the best choice for non-Western societies. It is impossible for non-western 
countries to either abandon their traditional culture to develop a whole new 
modernity, or to develop a homogenous modernity in accordance with western 
standards. Furthermore, there is no point arguing the superiority of the western 
model of development, by comparing western modernity with non-western 
modernity. Alternative modernities will become important phenomena in our 
developing world. 
Introduction  
Stuart R. Schram, an American political scientist and sociologist, considers Mao Zedong as 
one of the giants of the twentieth century. He makes a comment on Mao’s life:  
 
Few major figures of the twentieth century have been subject to such widely varying 
assessments as Mao Zedong. In the 1940s, he was seen in many quarters (including the 
Kremlin) as a talented guerrilla leader whose Marxist credentials were of dubious 
authenticity. In the early 1950s, he was perceived rather as the ruler of a totalitarian 
party state, subservient to Moscow. Then, during the Cultural Revolution, he was 
metamorphosed once more in people’s minds (especially those of student rebels in the 
West) into an inspired visionary who had devised a new pattern of socialism, purer, 
more radical, and more humane than that of the Soviet Union. Finally, in his last years 
the view began to gain ground that he was, on the contrary, a harsh and arbitrary despot 
cast in a traditional Chinese mould……In addition, he was in a very real sense China’s 
Peter the Great: the first ruler who sought to modernize the country by drawing upon 
ideas and techniques of Western origin as none of his predecessors had done either 
before or after the fall of the empire (Schram, 1981, p. 188). 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that, in Chinese modern history, Mao himself and his revolution, 
even the controversial Cultural Revolution, have assumed monumental importance in China. 
Although several decades have passed since Mao’s death, it seems that Mao and his 
revolution(s) continue to be prominent in research about modern China. In Mao’s era, an 
outright process of deification promoted him to a supreme sacred peak during the Cultural 
Revolution in the late 1960s. Furthermore, the great upsurge of Mao’s cult during the Cultural 
Revolution almost coloured the whole world of late 1960s red with various slogans, red flags, 
Mao’s portraits and little red books. 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform and Opening Up policy1 marked the start of a new era in 
China’s modernization history --- the post-Mao era. The strategy of focusing on economic 
development has had a great influence on China’s social economic and political structure, and 
                                                             
1 Refers to the program of economic reforms called “Socialist Market Reform with Chinese Characteristics”, which began in 
1978 by Deng Xiaoping, a reformist party leader in CCP. Because the reform involved the decollectivization of agriculture, 
the opening up of the country to foreign investment, and permission for entrepreneurs to start up businesses, the reform is 
called as “Reform and Opening Up”. 
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on the minds of its people. Since 1979, not only have the draconian controls on bureaucracy 
been loosened, but the previous unchallenged reputation of Mao has slumped. “Going into 
business” and “making money” have become new fads in mainland China. Dutch journalist 
Willen van Kemendade wrote in his book China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc.: The Dynamics of 
a New Empire that the Chinese people had evolved from being "Mao-worshiping blue ants" 
to "nihilistic, ultra-individualistic, money-worshiping hedonists"(Kemenade, 1997; 
Kemenade & Webb, 1998). 
 
On the other hand, this is only one side of the post-Mao era. Mao’s cult still exists in various 
forms, which is even more remarkable in modern Chinese society. The following are three 
reports that appeared on one of the most popular Chinese news websites 
(www.xinhuanet.com) in 2009:  
 
 According to staff of the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall, on April 4, 2009, at the 
traditional Chinese Qing Ming Festival，30,643 visitors, 10,000 more than normal 
days, visited the Hall in only the morning of that day (G. Zheng, 2009).  
 The 9th of September in 2009 was the 33rd anniversary of Mao Zedong’s death. On 
that day, over 20,000 people visited the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall (X. Sun & 
Tang, 2009).  
 On the first three days of the holidays of the 2009 National Day, the birth place of 
Mao Zedong , Saoshan (韶山), received 127,500 domestic tourists, and earned an 
income of 1,320,000 yuan from tourism . On October 2, 2009 only, there were 
60,000 tourists, 28% up on that day in the previous year.  We were experiencing the 
upsurge of “Red-Tourism” (Xie, 2009). 
 
As far as the above reports are concerned, these cannot simply be viewed as anecdotes, or as 
manifestations of people’s worship of a former political leader. For many Chinese people, 
these visits to his birth place remind them of Mao’s cult, which was at its high tide during the 
Cultural Revolution. The worship of Mao did not disappear with the development of the 
socialist market economy. 
 
It is well-known that Mao’s cult was officially terminated with the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in the latter part of the 1970s. Since then, the personality cult of Mao gradually 
faded from the public eye, yet, according to the above reports, it seems that Mao’s cult is 
making a comeback after two decades. No matter what motivated these visitors to visit the 
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birth place of Mao or pay their respects to the mortal remain of Mao, these places have 
become popular and important tourist sites for many people to spend their holidays. Li Jie, a 
Chinese cultural critic, said: 
 
Although the Mao Zedong phenomenon is a historical fact, it is not merely a 
historical phenomenon with psychological, linguistic, political, and even economic, 
military, literary, philosophical, as well as physiological and anthropological 
dimensions (as cited in, Barmé, 1996, p. 140).  
 
The Previous Studies on Mao Zedong and his Cult 
In mainland China before the 1980s, the lack of studies on Mao contrasted with the 
overwhelming propaganda for deifying Mao. Therefore, for a variety of social and political 
reasons, the study of Mao’s cult was particularly unsatisfactory before the 1980s within 
mainland China. In contrast, attention to Mao started outside China as early as the 1930s. 
Some Western correspondents visited China and introduced Mao and his revolution to the 
Western world with their books. Examples are Edgar Snow’s Red Star over China and 
China’s Long Revolution; Agnes Smedley’s Battle Hymn of China; and Anna Louise Strong’s 
China’s Millions: Revolution in Central China. (Smedley, 1944; Snow, 1968, 1974; Strong, 
1965). These vivid narratives were clear portraits of Mao and his revolution in its formative 
stage, and made Mao known to the Western world. However, because these works were only 
biographical reporting and narrative stories, they were only appropriately regarded as 
research materials for later studies.  
 
In 1951, a Western scholar, Benjamin Isadore Schwartz, coined a term “Maoism” and 
elaborated on its meaning in his book Chinese communism and the rise of Mao (B. I. 
Schwartz, 1951). This book was variously marketed from a biographical study of Mao to an 
academic work on Mao. During the 1960s around the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the 
Western study on Mao was in full swing (A. Cohen, 1964; Lifton, 1968; MacGregor-Hastie, 
1961; Moravia, 1968; Payne, 1961; Schram, 1967; Strong, 1965; Tsou, 1969). These works 
made a valuable contribution to the study on Mao and were of importance to those who were 
interested in the development of Mao’s China. Most of the publications at this stage were 
concerned with the evolution of Maoism and Mao's struggle for power. These researchers are 
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characterized by their challenge and even hostility to and sarcasm against Mao and his 
revolution. Moreover this tendency was reinforced when the news of the bizarre cult of Mao 
Zedong reached western academic communities (A. Cohen, 1964; B. I. Schwartz, 1951). 
 
For example, in disagreeing with the high praise given to the Maoist contribution to Marxism 
by the CCP, Cohen conceived that Maoist theories deviated from Marxist-Leninist’s 
communism and made little original contribution to the theory of Marxism, because of 
“Mao’s personal and chauvinist conceit” (A. Cohen, 1964, p.81). For Schwartz, the term 
"Maoism" indicated that Mao Zedong's revolutionary strategies were Marxist "heresies"(B. I. 
Schwartz, 1951). No matter whether viewed as “deviated from Marxist-Leninist’s 
communism” or as “Marxist heresies”, it seems that Mao and his revolution and even his 
attempts to push Chinese development and modernization were regarded as an anomaly in the 
Western world by these Western writers. That is to say, these Western writers’ assumptions 
were closely associated with the classical theory of “modernity”, by which the term 
“modernity” and “modernization” were regarded as a manifestation of Western cultural pride 
and arrogance. Furthermore, all of these seemed to imply that the way of modernization and 
development of non-Western countries would necessarily follow the way of the Americans 
and the Europeans (Schram, 1988, p.109).  
 
One of the causes of hostility or disgust to Maoism and Mao’s way of modernization by those 
Western writers is Mao’s despotism and his acting out his own cult role, even magnifying its 
moral, religious, and magical aspects to extremes. This cause was obvious from reading 
Lajpat Rai’s article, in which he concluded that:  “All cults and the automatic view of things 
as magic politics have to be thrown out of the window if China has to advance on the road to 
economic development and social transformation in the modern world” (Rai, 1984).  
 
Therefore, the question of how to understand Mao’s cult is crucial to further research into 
Chinese modernity and modernization. Moreover, this gap is more of a significant issue in 
Chinese academic literature than in the Western academic literature. 
 
Although after 1981, with Deng Xiaoping’s reform and the Opening Up policy, a large 
number of historical archives were made public by the government, which led to a reappraisal 
of Mao and his revolution in scholarly works, few scholars have studied Mao’s cult in the 
context of modernity in mainland China. In the 1990s, especially, some previous political 
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senior officers and staff who had worked at Mao’s side published memoirs that revealed 
previously unknown facts and events about Mao, such as Recollections of Chairman Mao: 
My Own Experience in Several Major Historical Events by Wu Lengxi (吴冷西)  (L. Wu, 
1995); My Own Experience During the Great Lap by Li Rui (李锐)  (R. Li, 1999); and 
Rethinking by Wang Li (王力)  (Wang, 2001)；and Notes of the CCP : from the Zunyi 
Meeting to Yan'an Rectification by He Fang(何方) (F. He, 2005)2.  
 
Despite the various foci of above books, their common purpose is to remove the sacred aura 
surrounding Mao and to demote Mao from a “Shen” 3 (deity) to a person. They are responses 
to the CCP’s official reappraisal of Mao, which rates Mao’s life career as composed 70% of 
merits and 30% of demerits4. Written by former officials rather than academics, these works 
has provided rich facts about the historical developments and practices of Mao’s cult, but 
little effort has been made at interpreting these facts from a sociological perspective. 
 
How did the sun rise over Yan'an: a history of the rectification movement was written by Gao 
Hua(高华) (Gao, 2002) is one important scholarly work on Mao’s cult. This book failed to 
get published in mainland China but was published in Hong Kong. In this book, Gao 
concentrates on the detailed historical facts of Mao’s rise from the Yan’an rectification 
campaign. However, for Gao, Mao’s cult was just a sordid political strategy. The book fails to 
put Mao’s cult within a broader historical, social and cultural context and to interpret it from 
a sociological perspective. The same can be said of Feng’s work. (J. Feng, 2006). As another 
work on the historical details of Mao’s cult, it fails to put the phenomenon in a broad social 
and cultural context and to provide a sociological interpretation of the phenomenon of Mao’s 
cult.  
 
Among Western scholars, some scholars attempted to interpret Mao’s cult as a religious 
phenomenon. Ninian Smart‘s Mao is one of the earliest books which argued for the 
analogical features between Mao’s cult and a religion. Raymond Whitehead considers 
Maoism as having “God’s saving power” in China (quoted in Janz, 1998, p. 139); Stefan R. 
Landsberger considers Mao as a Chinese traditional Kitchen God (Landsberger, 1996, 2002). 
                                                             
2 For details, see Chapter 3. 
3 Although there are some differences between the connotations of the English words “god” and Chinese word “Shen”, this 
translation of “god” is the closest to the original meaning of “Shen”, and it is also the most recognized translation so far.   
4 For details, see Chapter 7. 
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Scholars who have the same views include Kitagawa (1974), MacInnis (1969), and Woo 
(1973), who “regard Maoism as a ‘religion’, a ‘quasi-religion’, or a ‘religion surrogate’ ” 
(Caldarola, 1982, p. 570). Zuo Jiping and Emilio Gentile regarded Mao’ cult as a political 
religion (Gentile, 2006; Zuo, 1991).  All these researches tried to interpret Mao’s cult as 
derivative of Chinese traditional religion. There is partial truth in this view, but merely seeing 
it as a remnant of the Chinese traditional religion is not sufficient to explain the fact that 
Mao’s cult is part and parcel of the CCP’s pursuit of modernization and modernity, and is a 
phenomenon that co-existed with social and political movements launched by CCP to break 
with the past and the tradition. 
 
Taking into account the revival of Mao’s cult since the 1990s, there are few studies that 
analyze the ambiguous religious phenomenon in folk society, except for a few less 
illuminating studies by scholars whose interests are simply to mention it as a bizarre social 
phenomenon in modern China (A. P. Cohen, 1993; Macartney, 2006 ). Some Chinese scholars 
also tried to analyze it. Zhou Qun and Yao Xinrong distinguished two kinds of Mao’s cult, 
and argued that, in the old cult, Mao was respected as a father of all the people in China, but 
in today’s Mao’s cult, Mao is treated as a deity or an apotropaic symbol (Zhou & Yao, 2003). 
However, unfortunately, their research is in large part flawed by an inadequate understanding 
of the modern background of Mao’s cult, a deficiency that results in the inadequate analysis 
and interpretation of Mao’s cult as a particular Chinese modern social phenomenon.  
Understanding Mao and His Cult 
As cultural developments are not homogenous, the diversity of modern development should 
be accepted. China is one of the oldest civilizations with a long history and splendid 
traditions, which should not be overlooked when trying to understand modern China. Mao’s 
cult, as a case typical of those which bewilder the Western world, is remarkable for the fact 
that it runs through the entire developmental history of the PRC, from Mao’s time to today.  
 
In fact, as a founder of new China, Mao was faced with a series of difficulties and 
challenges, such as how to break through the United States’ and Soviet Union’s containment, 
and how to develop economic growth in such a vast and populous agricultural country. In his 
legendary life, Mao had determined to construct a new modern China, and create a new 
world for the Chinese. For Mao, the new China should neither continue the old Chinese 
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pattern, nor follow Western models. Although he consistently defined China's economic 
aims in term of modernity or modernization, from the 1940s to the 1960s, his way of pursing 
modernization was unique. Externally, he continued the spirit of iconoclasm from the May 
Fourth New Cultural Movement and advocated modern democracy, but internally, through 
the experiences of his life, he adopted little from the Western model of modernity. The 
Chinese modernization under Mao followed a different track from the Western version.  
 
However, no matter how Mao acted out his own cult role, magnifying its moral, religious, 
and magical aspects to extremes, he did so in order to realize radically modern and 
untraditional values. Maoism was the theoretical basis of Mao’s rise to power (B. Schwartz, 
1960), and at the same time, the traditional religious culture was the social-psychological 
basis for the worship of Mao.  
 
All of this resulted in Mao and Mao’s China becoming “heresies” compared with Western 
“capitalist” modern development and the Soviet “socialist” model. Moreover this has created 
ambiguity and uncertainty in accounting for the persistence of Chinese traditional culture in 
the process of Mao’s pursuit of the new China’s modernization. Therefore, one of the aims 
of this research is to examine how the revival of Mao’s cult after the 1990s intensified these 
ambiguities and uncertainties. 
 
The bewilderment caused by Mao’s cult in modern China could be categorized into two 
aspects: one is how to define the phenomenon of Mao’s cult; is it a kind of religion in 
China? The other aspect is the relationship between this typical traditional social 
phenomenon and the process of Chinese modernization.    
 
In this thesis, the theory of Alternative Modernity is introduced to illuminate Mao’s cult as a 
modernity which is an alternative to the Western version, and as a product of the Chinese’s 
efforts to pursue modern development. Using the theory of Alternative Modernity to 
interpret Mao’s cult as a remarkable social phenomenon in China, this thesis shows how 
Chinese traditional cultures persist along with modernity, and how to understand the 
transformation of these traditional cultures in the modern era.   
 
Therefore, in the first part of this thesis, I will explore what Western modernity and the 
alternative modernity are; then I will review the early modernization in China (before 1949) 
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to see how Western modernity influenced China’s early efforts towards modernization. In the 
second part, the early cult of Mao (before the 1980s) is analyzed, and the revivals of Mao’s 
cult in current China are studied. Furthermore, I explain why it is unnecessary, in the Chinese 
context, to address the question of what “religion” exactly means, and how it is better to 
regard Mao’s cult as just a religious phenomenon. Finally, I argue that understanding Mao’s 
cult will help to further understand the uniqueness of Chinese modernization and the 
alternative modernity in China. 
 
 
9 
 
Part I 
Chapter 1  
Modernity and Alternative Modernity 
Modernity and modernization refer to the social processes and discourses which are 
subsequent to the Age of Enlightenment in the 16th century. To a certain extent, we can say 
that the Age of Enlightenment, and its core value ---- the emphasis on the rational and 
rationality - brought about modernity. In the 1950s, some scientists in the field of sociology, 
economics and political science initiated researches on modernization5. Since then, modernity 
and modernization have become generally accepted technical terms in multiple disciplines.  
 
Historically, modernity and the process of modernization originated in Western Europe, and 
then expanded to other parts of Europe and America. From the twentieth century, countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, which were colonized by Western powers, have pursued the 
Western style of modernity. Therefore, the early theories of modernity were deeply imprinted 
with more or less Occidental/European or Western-centered ideologies.  
 
Eurocentricism in theorizing modernity may even be traced back to Max Weber. Weber’s 
Author’s Introduction in his English edition of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, explicitly states “only in the west does science exist at a stage of development 
which we recognize today as valid” (Weber, 1978b, p. 13). Thereafter he logically asserts that 
only Western societies have developed because of the rationalization in Western cultures. 
Later, Jürgen Habermas points out that the research on modernization could be conceived as 
“a theoretical approach that takes up Weber’s problem”. It refers to “a bundle of processes 
that are cumulative and mutually reinforcing: to the formulation of capital and mobilization 
of resources; the development of the forces of production and the increase in the productivity 
of labor; to the establishment of centralized political power and the formation of national 
identities; to the proliferation of rights of political participation, of urban forms of life, and of 
formal schooling; to the secularization of values and norms; and so on” (Habermas, 1987, p. 
2).  
                                                             
5 Such as, Max Weber (1864-1920) and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). 
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Early theories of modernity focused on the process of change in so-called Western countries 
in the period from the middle of the 18th century to the middle of the 20th century, and 
evaluated the process of progress that so-called developing countries emulated. However, 
these theories do not describe the historical diversity of various trajectories of developing 
countries. As Inglehart states, modernization theories are only partly right (Inglehart & Baker, 
2000).  
 
From the late 1980s, with the continual process of globalization and the downfall of eastern 
European communism, paradoxical features in modernity have drawn more and more 
attention from scholars (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Feenberg, 1995; Fernández-Armesto, 
1995; Schluchter, 1996; Taylor, 1995). They criticize theories of modernity that follows the 
Weberian vein as having been deeply involved in the assumption that the program of 
modernity, to be precise, the Western / European pattern of modernity, would ultimately 
prevail throughout the world. Fukuyama announces this as the homogenization of the liberal 
world-view and the predominance of the market economy (Fukuyama, 1992). All critical 
evaluations emphasize the fallacy of the early theories of modernity, in which the 
pervasiveness of Western intellectual and cultural hegemony are so patently obvious. 
However, albeit that the early theories of modernity have undergone such severe criticisms, 
these theories have still been the critical indices by which to evaluate the socio-economic and 
political situation of a country, not only in the west, but also around the world. 
 
The situations above entailed some radical challenges to modernization or modernity, 
especially after World War II. Various social, political or religious movements occurred, such 
as anti-Westernism, anti-globalization, nationalism, racism, and even fundamentalism6. All 
these movements indicated that capitalism and democracy with Western characteristics have 
failed to become universal on a global scale.  Meanwhile, the west was confronted by its own 
inherent problems that challenged the fundamental premises of its own social system (Beck, 
et al., 1994, p. 1). In fact, the return of nationalism and racism has not only re-emerged in 
America or Asia, but also in Europe.  
 
Moreover, in this early understanding, the core concept of modernity was so-called 
                                                             
6 See, for example, Podobnik, Bruce, & Reifer, Thomas Ehrlich. (2004). The Globalization Protest Movement in Comparative 
Perspective. Journal of World-Systems Research, 10(1), 3-3-9 (Podobnik & Reifer, 2004). 
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development, which could be replaced with some similar abstract concepts, such as 
industrialization, urbanization, specialization, bureaucracy, and secularization. With the 
growing colonial expansion of the imperialist powers, modernity spread into non-Western 
society, through which these abstract concepts became the sole critical indices to evaluate 
later development in these non-western societies. More importantly, economic development 
was expected to bring about pervasive cultural changes. Ultimately all societies would have 
similar major institutional features, thereafter similar cultures and values, and finally, similar 
characteristics of modernity. This is the classic theory of modernization which predicts the 
convergence of industrial societies (Eisenstadt, 1974, p. 232; 2000), or the dominant 
“acultural” theory of modernity (Taylor, 1995), etc..   
 
Regarding the effect of this kind of understanding of development, Charles Taylor comments 
that “acultural” theories will be devastating if we foist them on other cultures (Taylor, 1995). 
For Taylor, “acultural” theories view the change from earlier centuries to today as the demise 
of a “traditional” society and the rise of the “modern”. Moreover, these theories tend to 
describe transformations from a culture-neutral perspective, which sees that these 
transformations will have to be experienced by any traditional culture along a singular path 
toward a single ultimate modernity. Taylor criticizes it as “a falsely uniform pattern on the 
multiple encounters of non-Western cultures” (ibid).  
 
Furthermore, some non-Western societies, who pursue the Western version of modernity, fail 
to realize that this would lead to the dissolution of their own cultures. Lured by various 
temptations of modernity, these societies have transformed themselves in pursuit of 
seemingly prosperous futures. Yet, there still exist collisions and conflict between modernity 
and deep-seated cultural tradition. As Anthony Giddens argues, even though capitalist and 
imperialist colonialism seem to have exported many  modern and advanced products to non-
Western societies, the relationship between them was still exploitation and being exploited 
(Giddens, 1982). From this perspective, modernity and western capitalist expansion actually 
hindered normal development in those societies. Worse still, the western colonial powers 
constructed the colonial system in a manner that was most favorable to themselves. It is one 
of the critical facts that further entrenched under-development in other parts of world. With 
the expansion of modernity, underdevelopment in non-western countries is only aggravated 
(Giddens, 1982).  
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Therefore, modernity exists as a compulsion ---similar to the obsession or compulsion in 
Freudian sense-- which Giddens states is “the issue of addiction” (Giddens, 1994, p. 70). The 
traditions of native cultures were suppressed by a series of indices of evaluation which came 
out of abstract concepts of the early theories of modernity. Nevertheless, the repressed 
traditions, just like the unconsciousness in Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, could not be totally 
dissolved, whereas, they acted against the oppression in other more violent ways. That is the 
reason why S. N. Eisenstadt argues that “many of the movements that developed in non-
Western societies articulated strong anti-Western or even anti-modern themes, yet all were 
distinctively modern”(Eisenstadt, 2000).   
 
With all these doubts and challenges against the theories of modernity, two different kinds of 
responses came to the fore. One response declared that modernity as an epoch was finished, 
and postmodernity or post industrial society was approaching (Bell, 1973). This is a kind of 
absolute rejection/dismissal of modernity, no matter what its expression or its character is. 
Another reaction/response conceived that modernity as an epoch had not finished, but should 
be interpreted from a different angle. Obviously, the latter position looks relatively less 
radical, especially from the perspective of underdeveloped countries. Seeing modernity as a 
completed epoch may be suitable for western developed countries, but not for non-western 
countries. After all, it is a paradox to say that underdeveloped countries will enter into an 
epoch of postmodernity without experiencing modernity. The more realistic picture of 
underdeveloped countries is that they might still be in the process of finding a proper way to 
continue to develop, rather than being dragged into the so-called postmodernity before they 
finish their development. If this is true, then non-western societies could not get away from 
western life styles, and might be restricted by that style. In other words, to repudiate 
modernity and then to put forward the new concept of postmodernity could not solve the 
problem of applying the western concept of modernity in the context of non-Western 
societies. With regard to this point，Jurgen Habermas’ defence of modernity as an unfinished 
project (Habermas, 1987, p. xix) could be viewed as an explicit declaration of disagreement 
with the idea of postmodernity. 
 
There are two remarkable arguments, respectively coming from Francis Fukuyama and 
Samuel P. Huntington, which represent the absolute rejection of modernity. S. N. Eisenstadt 
summarizes these:  
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Two major interpretations of these events on the contemporary scene have emerged, 
one promulgated by Francis Fukuyama (1992) announcing the “end of history”--- the 
homogenization of the liberal world-view and predominance of the market economy, a 
perspective very close to the earlier theories of the convergence of industrial societies. 
The opposite view has been put forth most notably by Samuel P. Huntington (1992). 
While not denying the growing technological convergence in many parts of the world, 
this perspective emphasizes that the processes of globalization bring us not to one 
relatively homogeneous world but rather to a “clash of civilizations” in which the 
Western civilization is compared often in hostile terms with other civilizations ---
especially the Muslim and Confucian ones (Eisenstadt, 1999). 
 
For Eisenstaedt, both options of modernity from Fukuyama and Huntington have given rise to 
a series of discussions and reappraisals of the early theories of modernity and modernization, 
because they reveal a reality of inequality between Western civilization and other non-
Western civilizations. To some extent, this inequality is embodied in the confrontation of 
modernity and tradition. Therefore, the confrontation and tension between tradition and 
modernity becomes the key problem for understanding modernity, especially modernity in the 
context of non-Western societies. In fact, this attitude to tradition has its deep historical and 
theoretical origins in the Enlightenment.  
 
The Persistence of Tradition in Modernity 
The theory of modernity based on Enlightenment philosophy was viewed as a typical way of 
thinking with its rigid dichotomy and hegemonic ideology. Under such a framework, the 
early theories of modernity were characteristic of the dichotomy between tradition and 
modernity, conceiving them as opposite to each other, with tradition definitely setting back 
the development of modernity. “Modernity, almost by definition, always stood in opposition 
to tradition” (Giddens, 1994, p. 56). Even Michel Foucault also mentions that, “Modernity is 
often characterized in terms of the consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with 
tradition, a feeling of novelty, of vertigo in the face of the passing moment” (Foucault & 
Rabinow, 1997). The religious scholar Gustavo Benavides also held that, “a condition of 
modernity presupposes an act of self-conscious distancing from a past or a situation regarded 
as naive" (Benavides, 1998, p. 187). 
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The framework of the Enlightenment advocated reason as the only means of establishing an 
authoritative system of aesthetics, ethics, logic, and government. Especially following 
Weber’s analysis of various rationalities, so-called instrumental rationality was widely 
accepted and practiced. Albeit that Weber finally criticized the outcome as “an iron cage”, the 
predominant concept of rationality still forced our world into an irresistible fate, which 
brought about the consequence of an opposition between tradition and modernity. 
 
The rigid distinctions between traditional society and modern society in the early theories of 
modernity are enumerated as such： 
 
In this view, traditional society was depicted as static, with but little differentiation or 
specialization, a predominance of mechanical division of labor and a low level of 
urbanization and literacy. In contrast, modern society was seen as possessing a very 
high level of differentiation, a high degree of organic division of labor, specialization, 
urbanization, and literacy and exposure to mass media; modern society was viewed as 
imbued with a continuous drive toward progress. In the political realm, traditional 
society was depicted as based on elites ruling by some “mandate of Heaven,” while 
modern society was based on wide participation of the masses, who did not accept 
traditional legitimation of the rulers and who held these rulers accountable in terms of 
secular values of justice, freedom, and efficiency. Above all, traditional society was 
conceived as bound by its inherited cultural horizons, modern society as culturally 
dynamic and oriented to change and innovation (Eisenstadt, 1974). 
 
Eisenstadt also pointed out that some earlier theories contributed to the dichotomy of 
modernity and tradition, including Ferdinand Tonnies’ distinction between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft, H. J. S. Maines’ distinction between status and contract, Emile Durkheim’s 
early distinction between societies based on mechanical as against organic solidarity, and 
even Weber’s analytical distinction among the various bases of legitimation (Eisenstadt, 
1974). It should be said that there is nothing wrong in these distinctions, and modernity as a 
new epoch came about because of the existence of such distinctions. The only problem lies in 
that the extreme over-simplification of these distinctions entailed an outright rejection of 
tradition.  
 
Theoretically, this dichotomy is generally related to Kant’s What is Enlightenment, which was 
written in 1784, and was viewed by Foucault as an outline of the attitude of modernity. In that 
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essay, Kant argues that: “Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed 
immaturity”. For Foucault, Kant’s “immaturity” refers to one’s submission to someone else’s 
authority to lead him in areas where he should use his own reason. Drawing inspiration from 
Kant, Foucault conceives that modernity should be viewed as an attitude rather than a period 
of history. This attitude, in Foucault’s own words, is “a mode of relating to contemporary 
reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; 
a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of 
belonging and presents itself as a task” (Foucault & Rabinow, 1997, pp. 303-319). Therefore, 
according to the understanding of Kant and Foucault, modernity should be viewed as the 
spirit of reason and freedom. From then on, the explanations of modernity according to 
“reason” or “rationality” seem to be the most popular (Taylor, 1995). 
 
Under such a framework, similar to the understanding of authority, tradition is conceived on 
the basis of its abstract opposition (Gadamer, 1975, p. 282). In other words, the 
Enlightenment “takes tradition as an object of critique” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 274). According 
to this principle of enlightenment, in which authority is discredited and the decision of 
everything depends on the judgment of reason (Gadamer, 1975, p. 274), tradition, as one 
form of authority and the authority of what has been handed down to us, “is responsible for 
one’s not using one’s own reason at all”. The acceptance of the tradition implies/means 
obedience to authority in a blind manner, thereby lacking the power of reason. Thus, the 
division is based on a mutually exclusive antithesis of modernity vs. tradition, as well as 
reason vs. authority (Gadamer, 1975, p. 279).  
 
However, Gadamer does not agree with this kind of understanding of tradition and authority 
under the framework of the Enlightenment. Following the romantic criticism of the 
Enlightenment, his intention was the rehabilitation of authority and tradition (Gadamer, 1975, 
p. 278). Gadamer conceives that the essence of authority also rests on acknowledgement and 
hence on an act of reason itself (Gadamer, 1975, p. 281). Thus he contended that “there is no 
such unconditional antithesis between tradition and reason”(Gadamer, 1975, p. 282).  
 
Moreover, Gadamer was not satisfied with the rehabilitation of tradition, whose significance 
goes far beyond the above. For Gadamer, the reason for the rehabilitation of tradition is to set 
forth the theory of the “prejudice” of cognition, which is the fundamental of hermeneutics, as 
well as the fundamental of epistemology. If we take into account the theory of prejudice, it 
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was no longer sufficient only to rehabilitate tradition (Gadamer, 1975, p. 283). 
 
In terms of preservation as the essence of tradition, Gadamer further contends that the 
persistence of tradition needs to be affirmed, embraced and cultivated. Tradition is thus active 
in all historical change, rather than persisting inertly as something that once existed. 
Moreover, “Even where life changes violently, as in ages of revolution, far more of the old is 
preserved in the supposed transformation of everything than anyone knows, and it combines 
with the new to create a new value”(Gadamer, 1975, p. 282).  
 
Therefore, we can suppose that any cognition of modernity is based on a “prejudice” against 
tradition that came from pre-modern society. That is to say, tradition is not changeless, but 
developable in the new situation. Although the modern age is supposedly a new epoch in 
human history, we are still hardly able to free ourselves from tradition, as “we are always 
situated within traditions”(Gadamer, 1975, p. 283). But there are two facets of tradition. On 
the one hand, tradition is the old authority of what has been handed down to us, whose 
validity does not require any reasons but conditions us without our questioning it (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 282); on the other hand, the persistence of tradition is a freely chosen action with 
reason’s acknowledgement, and more importantly, tradition will be renewed and then a new 
tradition will be created.   
 
This is reminiscent of a term from Eric Hobsbawm, “invented tradition”, which means, in 
terms of the 19th and 20th centuries, “old traditions” are quite often recent in origin and 
sometimes invented (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, p. 1). Anthony Giddens also agrees that 
“the idea of tradition, then, is itself a creation of modernity” (Giddens, 1999, p. 39). 
However, Giddens disagrees with Hobsbawm’s denial of the genuineness of tradition 
(Giddens, 1994, p. 93). 
 
In this regard, modernity was a relative conception, which has a close relationship with pre-
modern tradition. In this same vein of Gadamer, Anthony Giddens points out explicitly that 
the tradition in modernity is no longer the same “old tradition” as in pre-modern society. 
While modernity dissolved the old tradition, it constructed some new traditions at the same 
time especially in the early phases of modernity when “a collaboration between modernity 
and tradition was crucial”(Giddens, 1994, p. 91).  
 
17 
 
Emphasizing tradition embedded in modernity, Anthony Giddens calls globalised modern 
society a post-traditional society (Giddens, 1994). Disagreeing to the idea of postmodernity, 
Giddens argues that western societies, as well as those non-western societies, were all 
experiencing a process of detraditionalization, which is the consequence of globalisation. But 
simultaneously, “even in the most modernized of societies today, traditions do not wholly 
disappear; indeed, in some respects, and in some contexts, they flourish” (Giddens, 1994, p. 
100). Sometimes modernity could create a new tradition, and yet sometimes, tradition might 
succumb to the force of modernity. Either way, modernity is always interwoven with tradition 
in unique and interesting ways in different societies. 
 
This helps understand why partial modernization or developments take place in some still 
traditional societies without overall modern changes (Eisenstadt, 1974), as, for instance, in 
some Asian or African countries. However, it is the interweaving of tradition with modernity 
that testifies to the viability of tradition in modernity. As Eisenstadt states, a previously 
traditional system could develop to be a so-called transitional system, which tended to 
develop “systemic characteristics and properties of its own, creating its own mechanism of 
stability and self–perpetuation” (Eisenstadt, 1974).  
 
As mentioned above, on the one hand there is a necessity to distinguish tradition from 
modernity; but on the other hand, there are interactions and interweavings between modernity 
and tradition. Tradition should not be the opposite of modernity, and to some extent, tradition 
provides the frame of reference for the understanding of modernity. Moreover, the persistence 
of tradition in modernity is not a negative or passive factor; rather it is an active one. As 
Eisenstadt says, by virtue of traditionality, traditional societies might be better able to nurture 
some required qualities than modern societies (Eisenstadt, 1974, p. 237). Preserved tradition 
is interwoven with some characteristics of modernity and then becomes a so-called created 
tradition. As a result, tradition, as an open system with continuation and variation, has 
survived across time and space. At the same time, modernity has been subject to alteration 
and has been presented with various transformations.  
 
From Modernity to Modernities 
Traditions can be conceived as very powerful restrictive forces to modernity. As Nilüfer Göle 
observes, one of the most important characteristics of modernity is its potential capacity for 
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continual self-correction (Eisenstadt, 2000, p.11). That is to say, modernity has a capacity to 
absorb change as it deals with various inherent problems within it.  
 
Based on this, two noteworthy concepts emerged and have contributed to some further 
improvements to the theories of modernity: Eisenstadt’s multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 
1999, 2000); and the concept of alternative modernity proposed first by Andrew Feenberg 
(Feenberg, 1995).  
 
Obviously, both these new concepts possess something in common: the keyword “modernity” 
has been replaced by “modernities”. However, it is not only a question of the singular or 
plural form of a word. What is more important is that they emphasize cultural pluralism; and 
that modernity should not be viewed as a singular phenomenon. This is a transformation in 
thinking. 
 
For Eisenstadt, the concept of multiple modernities is also rooted in the antinomies inherent 
in the cultural and political program of modernity, which is mainly manifested in various 
confrontations in the political arena. These confrontations finally resulted in a series of 
changes in institutional and ideological premises, especially regarding the boundaries of 
autonomous human agency, collectivities and collective identities. Under these conditions, 
during the nineteenth century and the first six decades of the twentieth century, various social 
movements---- liberal, socialist, communist, and later fascist and national-socialist 
movements---- broke out and heavily weakened the hegemonies of the axial civilizations7. 
Because these movements took place in different societies with different specific traditions, 
the presentation and manifestation of modernity was diverse. In other words, as mentioned 
before, modernity was transformed by the persistence of tradition in those non-western 
societies.  
 
Eisenstadt’s concern about modernity focuses on political, ideological and institutional 
evolution in the modern age. He proposes that the first distinct ideological ‘alternative 
modernity’ is the communist Soviet type modernity, which emerged early in the 20th century 
(Eisenstadt, 2000, p. 11). For Eisenstadt, alternative modernities are marked by the tensions 
and antinomies of modernity. Moreover, a character worthy of our attention is that, although 
                                                             
7 Eisenstadt‘s “axial civilizations” comes from Karl Jaspers‘concept of “the axial age”. In my understanding, what Eisenstadt 
means by “the axial civilizations” is traditional cultures in the pre-modern age. 
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these movements critiqued and repudiated modernity and capitalism, “they sought in some 
ways to transpose them into their own particularistic visions” (ibid). 
 
Feenberg is the first scholar who explicitly proposes the theory of alternative modernity, but, 
different from Eisenstadt, his theory is based on a critique of the philosophy of technology. In 
Feenberg’s understanding, the progress of technology results in modernization and modernity. 
To some extent, innovations of technology are identified with modernity, but then evolve into 
technophobic ideologies8.  With the growth of modernity and its various crises, technophobic 
ideologies and their theoretical bases, as well as the philosophy of the Enlightenment9, came 
under vigorous attack. The Frankfurt School is one of the pioneers of these critiques 10. 
Although Feenberg agrees with the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of technology, he 
attempts to overcome the Frankfurt School’s radical skepticism regarding the domination of 
human beings by technology.  
 
From his main theme, which is “the inextricable intermingling of scientific-technical 
rationality and culture”, Feenberg argues that technology could still be managed and modified 
by a diversity of social cultures, against the prevailing technophobic ideologies of the 1960s: 
 
Modernization itself, I argue, is a contingent combination of technical and cultural 
dimensions subject to radical variation. Aesthetics, ethics, and culture can play a role 
alongside science and technology in the emergence of alternative modernity (Feenberg, 
1995, pp. ix-x). 
 
Feenberg’s reflections on modernity show, again, that there is a kind of false rational 
universalism of modernity, which contains a hidden biased western centralism. Furthermore, 
there is a complicated discourse system on modernity, which disguises particularity as 
universalism, and assumes various unexpected interweaving of universal discourse and 
particular expressions. No matter how hard some critics challenge this kind of universalism, 
they all fail. The only reason is that technology, as the most important basic part of our lives, 
                                                             
8 This is the term from Andrew Feenberg, who refers to “technophobic ideologies of the sort that emerged in the mass 
culture and politics of the 1960s” that “underestimate the potential for reconstructing modern technology. This potential is 
most clearly exemplified by the history of the computer” (Feenberg, 1995). 
9 What I mean by “the philosophy of the Enlightenment” is “the rational and rationality” as the internal core of the 
Enlightenment were transformed into “instrumental reason”. Refer to Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's book 
Dialectic of Enlightenment , written in 1947, Hollywood)  
10 Such as Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964), in which expresses his concerns about modern capitalism 
restricting the possibility of opposition. He believed that the industrialization was creating a one-dimensional way of 
thought and behavior which decreased opposition towards capitalism. 
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has already established its predominant position in our societies, and that will take a long 
time to shift. Feenberg puts forward his own Critical Theory, which advocates that, since our 
lives have been altered by technology, we should allow technology to penetrate into our lives, 
and then critique it, by which we might then direct the orientations of the design of 
technology and make use of it.  
 
Obviously，from the perspective of technology, Feenberg scrutinizes an alternative 
modernity with an optimistic attitude, and even welcomes the coming of various new 
alternative modernities. In contrast, Eisenstadt critically expounds new problems arising from 
the variability of modernities. For example, the new modern constructions of the boundaries 
of collectivities and collective identities resulted in a series of modern modes of barbarism, 
and the ideologization of violence, terror, and war.  
 
Of the two theories, multiple modernities or alternative modernity, which is the more 
appropriate? The emphasis of the adjective “multiple” only describes the situation of 
coexistence of various modernities. However, there are some more meanings for the adjective 
“alternative”. Not only does the adjective “alternative” mean the coexistence of various 
modernities, but also it implies and emphasizes the meaning that there are other kinds of 
modernities outside of the mainstream of western modernity. Therefore, alternative modernity 
would be the more appropriate term. 
 
Alternative modernity 
Modernity holds a powerful and overwhelming attraction around the world. However, 
whether from the perspective of ideology or technology, singular modernity entailed some 
kind of paradox/antinomy that was exacerbated intensively and radically when modernity 
encountered non-western societies in the process of globalization. For these non-western 
societies, the values of so-called normative modernity have evolved from the hegemonies of 
western ideology and cultures, but are disguised as a universalism of general values. It is the 
challenges to this hegemonic western modern cultural value that generated alternative 
modernity.  
 
It may be claimed that alternative modernity emerged at the same time as the expansion of 
the western modernity. Alternative modernity could be understood as a new cultural pattern, 
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in which the relationship between modernities and the persistence of tradition in specific 
societies plays a dominant role in their development, whether actively or passively.  
 
Alternative modernity developed passively as a result of the expansion of capitalistic 
colonialism into non-western societies. In such a situation, the colonial cultures demonstrated 
absolute predominance, suppressing local native culture. In spite of the continual outbreak of 
some movements of anti-colonialism or even anti-modernity, these colonized societies still 
inevitably stepped into the modern age.  While the local native culture was undermined, it 
could still penetrate into the development of modernities in a passive way. At the same time, 
the tradition of the local native culture was altered and assimilated with the colonial culture, 
thereby forming one possibility of alternative modernity. 
 
Another possibility of alternative modernity exists only in some sovereign nation-states. 
Initially, modernities, in specific societies, could take advantage of what they needed from the 
original pre-modern society, and then develop that into an alternative version, characterized 
by local needs and cultural traits. Alternative modernity could be pursued initiatively, with 
self-correction and self-shaping, based on the specific social-cultural background. 
Modernities developed in alternative ways through the incorporation of imported modern 
technology and the ideas of civil democracy, as local societies constructed their own 
collective identities to satisfy their specific needs and their different social strata. That is the 
reason why Feenberg argues that it is more productive to focus on the reconstruction of 
technology rather than on its vilification11 (Feenberg, 1995, p. 6). 
 
Elites and intellectuals in non-western societies are the main forces promoting alternative 
modernity. They critique and even reject aspects of western modernity, but meanwhile, they 
also participate actively in the new development of modernities, which merge western 
modernity with their own original cultural tradition (Eisenstadt, 2000, p. 14). It is no 
exaggeration to say that they have never even authentically deviated from their own tradition. 
Just as Eisenstadt says that, “Although initially couched in Western terms, many of these 
themes found resonance in the political traditions of many of these societies” (ibid).  
 
                                                             
11 Feenberg mentions the ways that the Japanese appropriated Western technology to mesh with their own traditions and 
cultural and social systems. Feenberg holds that technology can be reconstructed, to serve human and social needs and not 
just hegemonic societal interests. 
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In today’s age of globalization, alternative modernity inevitably will be one of the important 
traits of the development of our world. To acknowledge this implies that there is not a general 
trend toward a homogenous modernity, because cultural developments are not homogenous. 
We have to recognize the limitation of western culture and its pattern of modernity. Then we 
can scrutinize various non-western alternative modernities.  
 
As far as the terms of modernization and modernity are concerned, there has been an 
enormous literature on their meanings and distinctions, making it difficult, if not impossible, 
to highlight all aspects of the theory of modernity and modernization. To make it manageable, 
I will see modernization as a process in which a society shifts from tradition to modernity. 
The term modernization will put more emphasis on the process of transition from tradition to 
modernity, while the term modernity emphasizes the accomplished features which result from 
the transformations in the modern age, in which such features make a strong impact on the 
institutions of the traditional economy, politics, social values, and cultural psychology.  
 
Emphasizing the persistence of traditions in modernity implies a focus on the particular 
features of alternative modernity, rather than the negation of the transformations and changes 
of modernities. China, as one of the oldest civilizations with a long history and glorious 
tradition, has been undergoing fundamental structural transformations and historical changes 
in the shifting process from a traditional society to a modern society. 
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Chapter 2  
Early Modernization in China 
It is reasonable to consider Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Reform and Opening Up’ policy in 1979 as the 
watershed in China’s history of modernization. However, the attempts at Chinese 
modernization started from the early 19th century12. These early efforts at modernization laid 
the foundation for Deng’s idea of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Furthermore, the 
phenomenal economic growth and the lack of democracy in today’s China cannot be 
understood merely as the result of Deng’s reform and opening up. Instead, it must be seen 
within the early context of Mao’s regime and looked at with respect to social situations of 
even earlier historical periods.  
 
Under the influence of Western imperialism, modernization has been an on-going project 
since the late 18th century in China. As we know, according to Weber’s theories, China failed 
to create indigenous industrial capitalism, because the significant influence of Confucian 
values13 in Chinese society was thought to be detrimental to the development of rationality. 
According to this view, Chinese traditional culture and values, especially Confucianism, 
lacked the intrinsic force to transform the society from tradition to modernity. Doubts have 
been raised already about Weber’s standpoint which can be considered Eurocentric as he 
failed to realize the diversity of alternative modernizations. However, it is true that Chinese 
modernization was a passive result of the challenge from Western modernity, rather than a 
spontaneous development.  
 
At the end of the 18th century, China was ruled by the Manchurian, known as Qing Dynasty, 
whose government implemented the foreign policy of secluding the country from the outside 
world. The late Qing arrogantly rejected any attempt to trade with western countries, which 
sparked off western invasions. At that time, European countries had begun to industrialise 
and were developing rapidly. Western military power was far superior to that of the Qing 
government, and the Qing forces collapsed at the first blow. As a result of the first Opium 
                                                             
12 In the early 19th century, the last Chinese feudal dynasty, Qing dynasty, began to launch a reform and develop some 
western modern industry and technology.  
13 Confucian values come from a Chinese ethical and philosophical system called as Confucianism. Confucianism originated 
from the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius (Kong Zi, 孔子， 551–478 BC). It involved a system of moral, 
social, political, and philosophical thought which is considered as a state religion in feudal Chinese dynasties.  
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War in 1840, Qing leaders were forced to sign a series of “unequal treaties”, that opened 
Chinese ports first to European countries, and then to the USA, and even to Japan. Huge 
indemnities demanded from western imperial powers bankrupted the Qing national treasury, 
and disrupted economic development. 
 
Along with the western invasions and aggressions, Qing was also plagued by many internal 
disturbances. A series of rebellions occurred across the country, such as the rebellions of the 
Taiping (1851-1864), the Nian (1853-1868), and the Boxer (1898-1901).  
 
These all hastened the decline of the Qing Dynasty. Yet, they also motivated some Qing 
officers to start to carry out a series of projects, called the ‘Self-Strengthening Movement’ of 
1861-95, to attempt to reform and reverse the situation. These projects can be considered the 
earliest official military and industrial modernization efforts initiated by the Chinese 
government. Unfortunately, the consequences of these modernizing attempts failed to lead to 
industrialization or capitalism because of the conservative -nature of the Qing government, 
which tended to prohibit the development of any private industrial enterprise. 
 
Likewise, the failure of political modernization was exemplified by the “Hundred Days 
Reform” of 1898, launched by Emperor Guangxu, who followed the advice of Kang Youwei 
and Liang Qichao, both of them famous reform-minded scholars at that time. Kang and his 
allies were strongly influenced by the Japanese and even western patterns of modernity, so 
the aim of their reform was to set up a constitutional/limited monarchy on the England model. 
Despite the fact that they did not reject Chinese traditional Confucianism, the reform was 
influenced by the influx of western ideas among the intelligentsia. Underestimating the 
vested interests of the conservatives, the 104 days of reform ended with a coup d’état 
engineered by the reactionary elites, with Empress Dowager Cixi14 as its leader.  
 
Unable to successfully deal with internal rebellions and western aggressions, the Qing 
Dynasty inevitably headed for collapse, which also signalled the end of the Chinese feudal15 
empire of over 3,000 years. In 1911, Sun Zhongshan (well-known as Sun Yatsen 孙中山), a 
                                                             
14 Empress Dowager Cixi (1835 - 1908) was the de facto ruler of the Manchu Qing Dynasty in China from 1861 to her death 
in 1908, controlled by two nominal emperors.  
15 In a Chinese context, the term “feudal”, which comes from Marxist views on historical periods, is used to describe not 
only a “feudal period” (Chinese history from the Zhou Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty), but also the generalization of “feudal 
consciousness”, which is considered as irrational, reactionary and backward and that hinders the progress of mankind. 
25 
 
pioneer of the Chinese democratic revolution, founded the Chinese Republic following the 
Wuchang Rebellion on the 10th of October 1911, also known as the Xinhai Revolution ( 辛亥
革命) or the 1911 Revolution. By attempting to implement and realize modern democratic 
and constitutional ideals, Sun envisioned China as a republic in which all Chinese people 
could exert their political rights and attain material well-being. 
 
Unfortunately, although the Xinhai Revolution of Sun succeeded in overthrowing the Qing 
Dynasty, the end of the feudal empire had not brought China peace. Granted, Sun put forward 
the Three Principles of the People (Sanmin Zhuyi 三民主义), which was the ethnic nation 
(Min Zu 民主), the people's rights (Min Quan 民权), and the well-being of the people (Min 
Sheng 民生), as a guideline for his revolutionary programme, and he also transformed his 
Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui 同盟会) into the National Party (Guomingdang 国民
党). Yet Sun’s revolution was still a loose confederation lacking discipline, which meant his 
government was not capable of carrying out the entire revolutionary programme. Moreover, 
he lacked sufficient organized troops of his own. Furthermore, his most important defect was 
that his overseas experience and western educational background led him to fail to take 
Chinese concrete situations (such as the peasant problem, the land problem etc.) into account. 
Consequently, as the second President of the Chinese Republic after supplanting Sun, Yuan 
Shikai quickly grabbed the fruits of the victory of the Xinhai Revolution, which threw China 
into a turbulent and confused fighting between warlords. Sun’s revolution seems to have been 
another unsuccessful project of Chinese modernization. 
 
It is more significant to discern that Qing’s government, as well as the early revolutionaries, 
were forced to carry out modernized projects under the threat of military invasions, rather 
than to carry them out on their own initiative based on a very immature social environment. 
As Chinese scholar Liu Xiaofeng says: “…modernity brought about an unparalleled 
transformation to China. As a result of this non-initiative modernization, the gap of modernity 
in China was presented with a dual character at that time: clashes between tradition and 
modernity, as well as between the ideology of western and China” (Liu, 1996, p. 2). Non-
initiative modernization seemed to be carried out merely by importing some western modern 
notions and imitating them, but obviously, this was ill-suited to the Chinese situation of a 
strong feudal conservative structure and various complex social problems. China did not fit 
neatly into the Western framework of modernity.  
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Chinese Enlightenment & National Salvation  
As a non-initiative modernization, the early process of Chinese modernity missed an 
important part of European history - the Enlightenment. Although there were some 
introductions of western cultural ideas by several scholars, these were far from being the 
complete ideas of the Enlightenment. Obviously, the normal process of development in China 
was interrupted by western invasions and domestic rebellions, which led to the national crises 
of the May Fourth Movement of 1919. It is generally perceived that Chinese Enlightenment 
started from the May Fourth Movement, almost half a century later than the early Chinese 
modernization mentioned above.  
 
As far as the content of Chinese Enlightenment is concerned, according to Li Zehou, a 
Chinese leading scholar of traditional and modern intellectual history and philosophy, the 
political imminence of national salvation overwhelmed the awakening of enlightenment (Z. 
Li, 1987). The patriotic passion kindled by the awareness of danger of national subjugation, 
dictated Chinese people’s general preoccupation with political movement/activities rather 
than with an intellectual/spiritual consciousness. That is to say, the Chinese Enlightenment 
almost failed if it is analyzed within the classical Western Enlightenment framework. 
 
However, as for the term ‘enlightenment’, Kant explained that it is man’s emergence from his 
self-incurred immaturity. Yet, the process should not merely refer to the spiritual level of 
“man’s emergence from one’s self-incurred immaturity”. As in Foucault’s remark, “Kant 
defines two essential conditions under which mankind can escape from its immaturity. And 
these two conditions are at once spiritual and institutional, ethical and political ” (Foucault, 
2004, p.43). If Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s definition of enlightenment is justified, 
then, Chinese enlightenment should not be understood as a failed one, just because Chinese 
enlightenment was overwhelmed by the possibility of the event of national salvation.  
 
In fact, Western enlightenment was also not only focused on the spiritual level. Compared 
with Chinese enlightenment, Western political and institutional enlightenment was guided in 
highly developed capitalist societies by a well-developed spiritual enlightenment, including 
ideas of freedom, equality, democracy, individualism and humanism. Yet, the earliest Chinese 
political and institutional enlightenment depended largely on imported western ideas, and on 
27 
 
the background of a semi-colonized and semi-feudal society without a fully developed 
capitalism. 
 
It is quite reasonable to propose that there are two types of enlightenment in Chinese modern 
history (Liu, 1996, p. 388). The early type of enlightenment, which took place during the 
May Fourth Movement, mainly involved absorbing western modern ideas and innovation in 
thought. Liu calls this the western enlightenment of freedom and democracy.  
 
However, the Chinese condition of internal disturbance and foreign aggression at that time 
triggered the Chinese elites to devote themselves to seeking alternative ways for saving the 
nation and population, rather than merely focusing on the spiritual lever. Instead of importing 
and imitating the Western modern thought, numerous people with lofty ideals shifted their 
attentions to political revolutions influenced by the Soviet’s October Revolution of 1917. Liu 
calls this the socialist enlightenment of people’s democracy. 
 
Compared with the early type of enlightenment, which emphasized science and democracy, 
the focus of the late type of enlightenment was on a Marxist and socialist revolution 
combined with the Soviet type of communist radical ideals and the democratic dictatorship of 
the proletariat. Political salvation seemed to have been the foremost and only choice for the 
Chinese. As a result, revolution on the political and institutional level had become an integral 
part of Chinese Enlightenment, as well as Chinese modernity (Kang, 1996).  
 
Strictly speaking, the aims of the Enlightenment, cultural reform, and the rejection of 
traditional culture, were all aimed at saving the nation and reforming national politics and 
society, rather than for the purpose of fighting for the inherent right of the individual --- that 
is, the freedom, independence and equality of the individual. Attaching great importance to 
political salvation as collectivistic values clearly exceeded individual values in the Chinese 
Enlightenment. All the advocating of modern ideas, such as freedom or democracy, was 
actually designed for political purposes based on the collective interest.  
  
Modernization under the Leadership of CCP 
There is no doubt that the critical point of the later Enlightenment was the founding of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which later took on a leading role in Chinese 
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modernization. After 28 years of war, the CCP won the final victory both in the War of 
Resistance against Japan (1936-1945) and in the Civil War (1946-1949). Subsequently, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949. Although given the poverty of China 
at that time, the new sovereign national state should have made the economic and social 
development the highest priority, the CCP, especially its leader Mao Zedong, had heavily 
emphasized the cardinal importance of political ideology, which focused on building up the 
authority of the CCP and consolidating its power in China.  
 
That is to say, although China was in urgent need of economic and social recovery from the 
ruins of invasion and wars, the Chinese modernization under the CCP still focused on 
political issues. Theoretically, compared with Marx’s argument that the economic base 
determined the superstructure, Mao preferred the determination of the economic base by the 
superstructure.  
 
Therefore, the major act for strengthening socialist modernization in new China was that the 
CCP tried to put modern democracy into practice by a series of political reforms. For the 
purpose of letting the people be the masters of the State, the National People's Congress as an 
organizational arm for state power was made China’s fundamental political system. What’s 
more, as a creative political party system, the new China adopted multi-party cooperation and 
political consultation under the leadership of the CCP. In this system, the CCP asserted that 
their aim was to serve the people wholeheartedly, and represent the fundamental interests of 
the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people16.  
 
Accordingly, it is fair to say that the CCP, in a hopeful manner, attempted to construct a 
modern democratic regime. However, although they possessed the innovative military 
prowess, as well as those creative democratic policies, the ruling of the PRC and its 
ideological and political framework, still operated on the basis of a traditional centralized 
political system.  
 
The alleged political party system of “multi-party cooperation and political consultation 
under the leadership of the CCP”, essentially, shifted its weight to the latter part: “the 
leadership of the CCP”. Likewise, the state system of “People’s democratic dictatorship” 
                                                             
16 see White paper on China's political party system, 2007. 
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actually ultimately focused on “dictatorship”.  
 
During the wars and through the first three decades of the PRC, the CCP launched numerous 
political campaigns, the contents of which ranged from “Ism”(zhuyi 主义) to “Line”(luxian 
路线), and then to “the Class”(jieji 阶级). From the Yan’an Rectification (Zhengfeng) 
Movement of the 1940s, to the Anti-Rightist Movement, to the Anti-Revisionism Movement, 
etc., all these campaigns, manifested recurrent internal political strife under the name of 
building the leadership and authority of the CCP. Simultaneously, the nominal privilege of 
collective interest tended more and more to centralize on the interests of the ruling group 
around Mao.  
 
Modern western democratic systems uphold civil society, which is viewed as a series of 
relative independent groups separated from the political arena and the state, whereas the early 
PRC under the rule of the CCP was a radical political and ideological society. The political 
and social makeup of the early PRC can be understood as a party-centered society. That is to 
say, in terms of the institutional framework of this type of society, the CCP held all the power, 
and furthermore, the party’s ideology penetrated into each facet and field of the society. The 
theories and policies of the CCP were promoted as the sole criteria for testing truth, and even 
as the sole sacred truth and belief among all Chinese people, taking the place of Confucian 
ethical ideas. A religious-like system of institutions gradually came into being (Liu, 1996, p. 
410). Liu Xiaofeng called it a “state system with religiousness” or “Ism with religiousness”, -  
the determining modern feature of religious culture in modern China (Liu, 1996, p. 484).  
 
It is not uncommon in China or in the West that a political culture mingles with religiousness. 
In the modern age, the tendency of secularization reinforces this kind of combination. 
Religiousness, normally with more or less traditional elements, can be seen in its various 
transformed forms persisting in modern political culture. Likewise, Chinese traditional, 
feudal, sacred patriarchal politics, and the cultural phenomenon of religious worship has 
persisted in the modernizing new China.      
 
In China, different from the West, without the political legitimacy of God, the persistence of 
traditional sanctification in political culture was proceeding in a quite covert manner. The 
CCP’s early political culture was deeply embedded in this traditional sanctification in 
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political culture. Moreover, it was almost completely hidden by movements for the drastic 
rejection and extermination of traditional culture and the advocacy for atheism in the early 
PRC. 
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Part II 
Chapter 3  
The Early Mao Cult 
Treating Mao as a sacred figure is not a new phenomenon in China. The earliest Mao cult can 
be traced back to the time of the Yan’an Rectification Campaign/Movement in 1940. After the 
heroic Long March (1935-1949), Mao had already become a legendary and messianic figure 
within the CCP. From then on, he possessed charismatic authority as a leader with various 
titles, such as the revolutionist, Chairman of the Military Commission, and the greatest 
theorist of Marxism-Leninism.  
 
Around the year 2000，some books about this phase of CCP’s history were published by 
several former senior CCP officials and related scholars. These books disclosed many 
historical facts and some little known aspects of Mao. Examples are:  Recollections of 
Chairman Mao: My Own Experience in Several Major Historical Events by Wu Lengxi17 (L. 
Wu, 1995); My Own Experience During the Great Lap by Li Rui 18 (R. Li, 1999); and 
Rethinking by Wang Li19 (Wang, 2001). Another two books failed to publish in mainland 
China but were published in Hong Kong: How did the sun rise over Yan'an: a history of the 
rectification movement by Gao Hua (Gao, 2002); and Notes of the CCP : from the Zunyi 
Meeting to Yan'an Rectification by He Fang20 (F. He, 2005). 
 
He Fang, who had a personal experience of the Yan’an Rectification Campaign, disclosed 
that, since the campaign, Mao had been treated as a supreme leader who was extolled with 
ecstatic enthusiasm. For example, in Yan’an at that time, “Zedong Youth Cadre College” was 
                                                             
17 Wu Lengxi吴冷西（1919-2002） was Director of Xinhua News Agency, Chief Editor of The People’s Daily , and vice-
minister of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee.  
18 Li Rui李 锐（1917-），was one of members of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, vice-minister of the 
Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee,  vice-minister of the Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electric 
Power, and Mao’s political secretary.  
19 Wang Li王力（1921-1996）was vice-secretary of Steering Committee for International Activities of the CCP Central 
Committee, Chief Editor of Hongqi Journal, and vice-minister of International Department of the CCP Central Committee. 
He also sat in on some conferences of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee.  
20 He Fang何方（1920--）was an assistant of Zhang Wentian,. a secretary of Zhang Wentian (30 June 1900 – 1 July 1976, 
also known as Lo Fu, and his name in Wade-Giles is Chang Wen-t'ien, who was was General Secretary of the CCP from 
1935 to 1945, and then minister of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee after 1949), describes a 
numerous of events which are not included in public documents and offers many important historical data in his narration.  
32 
 
established in 1940; the “Day of Zedong” was set up to assiduously propagate Mao as a 
supreme leader; the title of Wang Ming’s speech was “Learn from Mao Zedong”; Mao was 
crowned with titles as “great statesman and strategist for Chinese revolution”, “great 
teacher”, “steersman”, “great theorist/theoretician” and “great leader”; more and more written 
propaganda and encomium emerged in public. And all of these were the order of the day at 
Yan’an. Obviously, it is considered that Mao’s authority had been elevated since then. Just as 
He Fang says,  
 
The intention of the Yan’an Rectification Campaign, launched by the CCP, was 
designed for establishing the leadership of Mao and the authority of Mao Zedong 
Thought. This political movement inevitably created the personality cult, under the 
influence of Chinese tradition of the highest monarchical power, as well as 
international environmental at that time (F. He, 2005). 
 
Gao Hua, another Chinese scholar who devoted himself to the historical study of the Yan’an 
Rectification, pointed out that Mao’s power and influence had been all-powerful since 1942. 
Moreover, Mao’s emergence as the Party’s supreme leader was accompanied by a growing 
personality cult. On February 8 of that year, a “Zedong Day” was celebrated in Yan’an, and 
the audience approximated tens of hundreds. Maoism, and later Mao Zedong Thought, has 
been widespread since this time.  
 
The previous comrades of Mao could no longer be on equal terms with him. Furthermore, 
almost all of the leaders of the CCP around Mao became the promoters of Mao’s cult. They 
vied with one another to flatter Mao21. Although their motivations were largely for self-
preservation and escape from persecution, their role objectively was one of missionaries 
promoting their God ---- inseparable from their traditional consciousness of serving under a 
monarchal authority. As a result, a power struggle developed into a deification of authority. 
 
Mao, himself, by separating from his previous comrades in daily life, had begun to incarnate 
all the qualities of "dignity" and "majestic authority" associated with a ruler, which looked 
like ‘a certain force of destiny’ about him (Short, 2004, p. 313). In one of his early poems 
from 1936, Snow: to the tune of Chin Yuan Chun (沁园春·雪), he compared himself to those 
great Chinese leaders of antiquity, the founder Emperors of the Qin, the Han, the Tang and 
                                                             
21 For the detail of this , see Chapter 15 , pp 251-2, from (Gao, 2002) 
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the Song, and the Mongol Genghis Khan, bemoaning his failures, and then viewing himself, 
with great pretension, as a true hero of the time.  
 
Meanwhile, the rising wave of Mao’s cult was not limited within the party. Through 
ideological propaganda, in the guerrilla zones and base areas, mythologizing stories about 
Mao had begun to take shape. This widespread publicity promoted him as a deified figure 
among the masses --- their great savior with a miraculous power --- who would liberate them 
from the oppression of the "three big mountains" of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-
capitalism.  
 
The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 was accompanied with the rise 
of the Red Sun, Mao Zedong. The official portrait of Mao was hung on many official 
buildings (the most famous of which was the Tian’anmen rostrum) all over the new China 
after 1949.  
 
Nevertheless, the tendency of the personality cult of Mao was changed for a short period of 
time in the early days of the new China. In March 1949, according to Mao’s suggestion, the 
Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee proposed that no places or 
enterprises should be named after leaders and that there should be no celebration of their 
birthdays and no presentation of gifts. In 1956, the CCP’s eighth congress condemned the 
personality cult and argued in favor of collective leadership. Deng Xiaoping, who was the 
party's general secretary, declared "love for the leader is essentially an expression of love for 
the interests of the Party, the class, and the people, not the deification of an individual" 
(Meisner, 1982, p. 162). Thus it can be seen that, at that early time, the CCP, as well as Mao 
himself, made an outward show of disapproval of the personality cult.  
 
Mao’s Ambiguous Attitude toward his Personality Cult 
However, there were some evidences of Mao’s approval of the cult of himself. One extreme 
instance is that in 1950 Mao personally added a sentence of “Long live the great Chinese 
people’s leader Mao Zedong” on the slogan for May Day (F. He, 2005). 
 
Under the influence of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in 
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1956, serious concerns about the personality cult eventually resurfaced 22  from the 1958 
Chengdu Conference. It was Mao’s fear that what had happened to Stalin was likely to occur 
after his death. This resulted in Mao’s shift from an initial objection to a blatant advocacy of 
the personality cult. If we can say that Mao’s cult of around 1940 had the tacit approval of 
Mao, then Mao’s cult after 1956 was encouraged by Mao. 
 
Views on this issue by former senior CCP officials in their books coincide closely. From 
memory, they all mentioned several central events or conferences, which revealed Mao’s 
ambiguous discourses on the issue of the personality cult. In fact, on many occasions, Mao 
declared the necessity for a personality cult.  
 
In the memoirs of He Fang and Li Rui, they mention Mao’s speech at the Party Congress in 
Chengdu in 1958. Mao pointed out clearly,  
 
… the question at issue is not whether or not there should be a cult of the individual, 
but whether or not the individual concerned represents the truth. If he does, then he 
should be revered … There are two kinds of personality cult. One is a healthy 
personality cult, that is, to worship men like Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Because 
they hold the truth in their hand. The other is a false personality cult, i.e. not analysed 
and blindly worshiped? … (R. Li, 1999 , p. 188) 
 
Mao even said that if someone objected to the personality cult of Mao, it was because he 
himself wanted to be worshiped. Mao also said it was better to worship Mao himself rather 
than to worship others (R. Li, 1999, p. 188, p. 212). It appeared his conversion from implicit 
agreement to explicit advocacy of the personality cult grew from then on. 
 
Mao obviously attempted to hold to his power firmly and prevent the likelihood of its falling 
into others’ hands. Very quickly Mao’s speeches encouraged the personality cult of Mao to 
reemerge again. It was becoming increasingly apparent that the official transition from the 
sacralization of the nation and the party to the deification of the political leader had occurred. 
It seems that in literary and art works and in the media of that time, that there was endless 
extolling and praising of Mao. Numerous posters and songs referred to Mao as "A red sun in 
the centre of our hearts" and a "Savior of the people". 
                                                             
22 For an overview of the impact of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Mao’s cult, see (J. 冯. 
Feng, 2001)  
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In 1959, famous literates Guo Moruo(郭沫若) and Zhou Yan(周扬) edited a book Ballad on 
Red Flag (Hongqi Geyao 红旗歌谣)，in which they collected folk ballads singing the 
praises of the CCP and Mao all over the country.  One of the ballads which was active in 
Jiangling(江陵) region, was named Sing Mao Zedong:  
 
Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong, 
The timely rain for our transplanting rice seedlings; 
The gentle breeze in midsummer; 
The sun will never set down; 
The favourable wind will be for our sailing. 
If you don’t want to suffer poverty anymore, 
Please follow Mao Zedong. 
 
Another ballad goes:  
 
Pleasures come to us before we say a word, 
Let me sing a song and show you my true feelings. 
Singing makes the pine and cypress trees green fever, 
Singing makes the star bright forever;  
Chair Mao is my benefactor forever.  
 
Meanwhile, the major national or the CCP’s newspapers were beginning to print propaganda 
and praise for Mao and his great thoughts and achievements, even though China had just 
gone through the failure of the Great Lap and three years of famine, which were outcomes of 
Mao’s radical and romantic communist utopian ideal. 
 
In 1965, the American journalist Edgar Snow, who had known Mao on the Long March and 
had become an admirer, visited Mao in Beijing. He was perplexed to find "an immoderate 
glorification” of Mao: "Giant portraits of him now hung in the streets, busts were in every 
chamber, his books and photographs were everywhere on display to the exclusion of others” 
(Snow, 1974, p. 68). Mao seemed to be the only hero in the Chinese revolution.  
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A Movement for Creating a “Shen” (God)  
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966 by Mao, the Chairman of 
the PRC at that time, for the purpose of restoring the Chinese Communist Party and the 
country. This campaign was called a “ten year’s catastrophe” by many Chinese people later 
on. During this turbulent decade, the whole of China was flung into confusion, many events23 
occurred, and “millions of people were killed, committed suicide, or suffered unspeakable 
hardships both physically and psychologically”(Chang, 1999, p. vii).  
 
Lin Biao, military leader at that time and one of the biggest supporters of Mao's Cultural 
Revolution policies, and who was named Mao’s successor in 1969, glorified Chairman Mao 
to a ridiculous extreme. After the Lushan Conference of 1959, Li Biao, who replaced Peng 
Dehuai24 as the leader of Central Military Commission of the PRC, preached that “Mao’s 
thought is the acme of Marxism-Leninism of the time”, and learning Mao’s works was the 
shortcut to learning Marxism-Leninism. Through Lin’s promotion, the whole nation set off a 
great upsurge in “Flexible learning and the practice of Mao’s Thought”. In the foreword to 
the second edition of Quotations of Chairman Mao, he gave praise to Mao in an artificial and 
exaggerated way, such as “the Chairman Mao is such a genius who is born once in thousand 
years. Chairman Mao is the greatest genius in the world”; “Compared with Marx, Engels, 
Lenin and Stalin, Chairman Mao is a great man with the highest ideological level in the 
world. There is no man in the world who has a higher level than Chairman Mao… ”.25 It is 
also Lin Biao, who put forward that Mao was “great teacher, great leader, great supreme 
commander, and great helmsman”26. The ultimate aim of these glorifications was to establish 
the absolute and supreme authority of Mao within the Party and the country.  
 
The early three years of Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) represented the apex of the sanctity 
of Mao. There is no doubt that the Cultural Revolution was an out-and-out movement of 
                                                             
23 What Chang points out as events in the Cultural Revolution include : the Red Guards movement; nationwide 
revolutionary rebellion and great chaos; the fall of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and other party and state leaders; the military 
intervention; the forming of revolutionary committees to replace local party committees and administrative bodies; the Lin 
Biao affair; the movement to send millions of youth and intellectuals to the countryside; the campaign to criticize Lin Biao 
and Confucius; the Tiananmen Square incident; and so on.  See (Chang, 1999), p vii. 
24 Peng Dehuai, (October 24, 1898 – November 29, 1974) was a prominent military leader of the Communist Party of China, 
and China's Defence Minister from 1954 to 1959. 
25 These words originally came from one of Lin Biao’s speeches named “Directive on Carrying Learning Chairman Mao’s 
works to a New Stage”, when he had an interview with the heads of The PLA Military Academy, Political College,  the 
General Political and Propaganda Department, on September 18, 1966 
26 This expression was firstly stated on August 31, 1966, when Lin Biao had an interview with revolutionary teachers and 
students out of Beijing.   
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creating a modern “Shen” 27 in China. During those years, various symbolic glorifications of 
the Chairman Mao emerged in this frenzied political movement. The various symbolisms and 
liturgical rules were inevitably reminiscent of religious rituals. The charismatic leader Mao 
not only became a dictator but also a veritable deity among Chinese people at that time.  
 
Alberto Moravia, an Italian writer who visited China during the Cultural Revolution, 
describes the scene of the Cultural Revolution in the language of religion. For example, he 
called the plane on which he traveled from Guangzhou to Beijing as  “a flying chapel” or a 
church in the airplane (Moravia, 1968, p. 31); he called the Red Guard a “Children’s 
Crusade” and “Boy Scout” (Moravia, 1968, p.72); and so on.  
 
The fall of Lin Biao (1971) and his group curbed the excessive and overheated personality 
cult of Mao, and the educational movement for urban youth to work in the countryside and 
mountainous areas cooled the overzealous Red Guarders Movement. Nevertheless, the social 
phenomenon of Mao’s cult wasn’t officially restricted until Deng Xiaoping came into power. 
 
                                                             
27 Although there are some differences between the connotations of the English words “god” and Chinese word “Shen”, this 
translation of “god” is the closest to the original meaning of “Shen”, and it is also the most recognized translation so far.   
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Chapter 4  
The Revival of Mao’s Cult from the 1990s 
Entering the 21st century, along with fast economic development, the process of Chinese 
modernization appeared in a systematic and well organized manner. The economic 
development inevitably promoted subsequent changes in the social environment. Among 
these, the noteworthy phenomenon in China today is the re-enchantment of Mao Zedong.  
 
The Non-religious Mao’s Cult in China Today 
In the early 1990s, you could find a set of cassettes or discs titled The Red Sun in the streets 
and alleys of China, which was published by Shanghai Audio and Video Company. On the 
package  was the text, “hymns of praise to Chairman Mao”, and above it was a portrait of 
Mao and the picture of Tiananmen with rays radiating from it, symbolizing the sun. All 100 
songs in this album glorifying Mao, had swept over China through the 1940s, and were 
sweeping back again 50 years later. It is alleged by the company that they sold 70,000-80,000 
in less than a week. The sales figures went beyond all their expectations, and the demand for 
this album far exceeded the supply. In the winter of 1991, the whole of Beijing, and many 
other places in China, echoed to the strains of songs in The Red Sun (Ling, 2008). Here is a 
part of the lyric of one of the famous songs , sung by Li Lingyu, 
 
Beloved Chairman Mao,  
You are the red sun in our hearts, 
You are the red sun in our hearts.  
How many Words so deep in our hearts, we want to say to you, 
How many warm and fragrant songs, we wish to sing for you 
Millions of red hearts turn to Beijing, 
Millions of smiling faces turn to red sun, 
We wish our leader chairman Mao a long long life. 
We wish our leader chairman Mao a long long life. 
 
Since then, the tunes of The Red Sun have reverberated throughout the mainland of China.  
 
The 4th of April, 2009 was the Chinese traditional tomb-sweeping day. A notable news report 
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stated that the staff of the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall (Mao’s mausoleum), which lies on 
the southern flank of Tian’anmen Square, said that they had over 30,643 visitors on that 
morning alone (G. Zheng, 2009). On the 9th of September of the same year, it was reported 
that over 20,000 visitors filed past the body of the dead leader (X. Sun & Tang, 2009). On the 
first three days of the National Day Holiday in 2009, there were 12,750,000 visitors to see the 
birth place of Mao at Shaoshan in Hunan province (Xie, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, in recent years, various new statues of Mao have sprung up like mushrooms in 
Chinese cities. For example, in 2008, a 20.6 metre-high statue was erected in front of the 
campus entrance of Chongqing Medical University; a year later, in Mao’s hometown, beside 
the Yongzi River of Hunan province, a 32 metre-high sculpture of young Mao was set up for 
Mao’s 116th birth anniversary. In 2010, with proper ceremony, statues of Mao and other 
revolutionaries were welcomed into the Wuqi County (吴起县), a small town where the Red 
Army had passed through during the Long March.  
 
A series of commemorative activities of swimming across the Yangzi/Yangtze River and the 
Yellow River were held in many Chinese cities in recent years in memory of Mao, who 
possessed a penchant for swimming and swam across the Yangzi River many times. In 1956, 
Mao swam in the Yangzi River for the first time. Mao's swim became a major yearly event of 
commemoration, which gives thousands the opportunity to express their boundless devotion 
to the Chairman. They jumped enthusiastically into the water not only in Wuhan, at the very 
spot where Mao had entered into the waters, but also in the sea and in various rivers and lakes 
across the country. On the first anniversary, in 1967, there were 50,000 swimmers in lakes all 
over Beijing alone.  
 
On the Chinese Internet, there are more and more memorial websites in memory or in praise 
of Mao Zedong, for example, at tiexue.net, wyzxsx.com, maoflag.net, dfbx365.com, and 
people.com.cn, etc. On these websites, there are web pages dedicated to Mao, with titles such 
as “the Chairman Mao memorial hall”28, “light of nation”, or “the sun never sets?”29. 
 
Besides these nongovernment social phenomena, more political actions related to Mao’s cult 
also began to appear in public. One of the best noticeable events was that two parades in 
                                                             
28 For details, see http://mzd.wyzxsx.com/; http://www.dfbx365.com/jng/cgmzd.php  
29 For details, see http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/22226/70604/index.html  
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honour of Mao Zedong emerged in the 2009 national day’s ceremonial military review. The 
first centred on Mao’s huge portrait, which commemorated the moment when he announced 
the establishment of the PRC; the other centered on two slogans: “Long Live Mao Zedong 
Thought” and “The Chinese people have finally stood up”.  
 
The Religious Mao’s Cult in China Today 
On the 26th of December, 2005, the 110th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong, a folk observance 
emerged in Mao’s birth place, Shaoshan, as well as in other cities in China. With the pi-pa of 
loud firecrackers, many pilgrims knelt piously before the statues of Mao. Among these 
pilgrims, there were not only some simply dressed peasants, but also large crowds in well-
ironed uniforms. They bowed down upon their knees and then kowtowed to Mao’s statue 
accompanied by much lighting of incense (Jianghu, 2008) (See Figure 1 and 2).  
 
 
FIGURE 1  Mao's Pilgrims at Shaoshan, Hunan Province 
 
FIGURE 2  Mao's Pilgrims at Zhoukou, Henan Province 
 
Other interesting phenomena relating to the worship of Mao have not been uncommon. One 
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is that Mao’s images have become protective amulets for most Chinese taxi drivers, who 
think that Mao can protect their cars from accidents and harm. As Alvin P. Cohen described in 
his article, “A New Deity in the People's Republic of China: Mao Zedong”, many drivers 
believed that “Mao Zedong has become like a deity (shen, 神)” (A. P. Cohen, 1993). You can 
also find various drivers’ amulets in different online shops, with a claimed apotropaic 
function in warding off bad luck and calamities. As shown in the following figures, Mao’s 
images are set into various materials, normally with engraved words like “Safe trip wherever 
you go” or “Have a safe journey” 30 (see Figure 3). 
 
 
FIGURE 3  Mao’s image in various talismans 
 
Another is the images of Mao worshiped on the altar at many Chinese homes, not only during 
the Cultural Revolution, but also nowadays. According to the ‘Horizon’ public opinion poll 
on belief31, Mao’s statues or portraits are worshiped in 11.5% of families in 40 Chinese cities; 
second only to ancestors’ shrines which are present in 12.1% of families (see Figure 4). 
 
                                                             
30 Images courtesy of Taobao.com, one of the famous Chinese online shops  
http://store.taobao.com/shop/view_shop.htm?user_number_id=47041625&ref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.20112012.com%2F
xinkuan-9211821429.html&ali_trackid=2:mm_14959540_0_0,12046940:142500262_41_1700248833 
  
31 The poll was conducted by the consulting firm ‘Horizon’ in 2008, which surveyed residents in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Wuhan, and 40 other cities. More details about the results of this poll can be found at 
http://www.horizonkey.com/showart.asp?art_id=790&cat_id=6 (cite March 8, 2010) 
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FIGURE 4  The Poll on what is worshiped on the altar at Chinese homes 
 
Mao’s Temples 
In 2010, in the Mianyang city of Sichuan province, an 81 year-old retired man built a temple 
to Mao, named the Hong’en Temple (洪恩寺), on his own private plot (Zhuantie, 2010). 
Although there were not pilgrims on normal days, it had many worshipers during new and 
full moons.  
 
 
FIGURE 5  The Entrance of Mao's Temple 
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FIGURE 6  Mao's Statue in Mao's Temple 
 
The temple contains three wooden plaques with engraved golden words, which Chinese 
people call an antithetical couplet (See Figure 3 and 4). The meaning of both lines of the 
couplet on the scroll is to the effect that (Mao) should conquer the country, rule the country, 
and that all Chinese people should support and love him. The horizontal scroll bears an 
inscription which means that the real fate of the Son of Heaven is to believe that the world 
belongs to all, and that all should wish a long life for Chairman Mao. These words of praise 
extol Mao as “Zhenming Tianzi”( 真命天子, the real fate Son of Heaven), which is a title 
peculiar to an ancient emperor in China. 
 
Inside the temple, Mao’s gold statue locates the inner centre of the temple. He wears a yellow 
mantle/cloak, yellow being a special symbolic color of the ancient Chinese royal authority32. 
Besides Mao’s statue, the temple is also dedicated to Zhou En’lai and Zhu De. Before these 
three statuses, there are some lighting incense sticks on the table and several kowtow 
cushions on the ground.  
 
A journalist for Times Online, Jane Macartney, reported another temple to Mao in a small 
village in Shaanxi province. Although visitors are not allowed by the caretaker to burn 
incense before the statue, “many who come are disappointed at the restrictions”. Instead of 
this, visitors offer “gaudy plastic flowers and packets of the cigarettes that Mao chain-
smoked”, and “one cigarette is tucked between his pink-painted plaster fingers”(Macartney, 
2006 ). 
 
                                                             
32 Yellow was the symbolic color of emperor in ancient China. So yellow was often only allowed to be used to decorate royal 
palaces, altars, temples, and robes or attire of the emperors. 
44 
 
It is reported that there is another Mao temple located 60 kilometers away from a small town 
in Pingyang County - in Wenzhou city of the Zhejiang province (Zang, 2007)33. However, 
there is a saying that it is not a temple, but just Mao’s ancestor hall. Whether it is a temple or 
not, the fact remains that Mao is worshiped by Chinese civilians in the manner of a religious 
cult. 
 
The Story of Mao’s Apparition 
There is an outlandish story regarding Mao’s apparition in Xincai County of Hunan Province 
in Cao Jinqing’s book, China Beside the Yellow River, which records various events during 
his field work in several provinces in North China. Cao had a personal visit to the 
place/house of Mao’s apparition, and he described it as a witness:  
 
Entering into the hall, a standard image of Mao was detected on the wall, which is 
the widely known Mao’s apparition … It can be seen that it is obviously not 
intentionally painted on in an artificial way … (Cao, 2001,  p 596)   
 
According to Cao’s introduction, in 1988, the householder, Tian Shufa, found that an over-
10 year-old portrait of Mao on his wall had some little tear or damage, so he took the portrait 
off the wall and stored it carefully. At that time, there was nothing on the wall. However, five 
years later (1993), he was surprised when he found some shadowy/dim image of Mao’s 
portrait emerging on the wall, just where they had originally hung the portrait. Half a year 
later, the image was getting clearer. Quickly, the news got round, with people claiming that 
Mao Almighty appeared to them. Peasants in the area came in flocks to see and visit this 
mystical image of Mao’s apparition. 
 
The householder Tian told Cao that he and his family hadn’t thought so many people from 
all over the country, including Hong Kong and Taiwan, would visit. Some people came just 
out of curiosity, but more people came because of their reverence for Mao. Many of them 
went down on their knees and kowtowed to the image of Mao’s apparition as soon as they 
saw it, some with tears running down their cheeks. Poor householders couldn’t afford 
kowtow cushions, so their pillows served in their stead. 
                                                             
33 The news came from the blog of a photographer and columnist, named Zhang Xiang’ou. More details can be found at 
http://zhangxiangou.blshe.com/post/28/40167 (cite September 16, 2010) 
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Cao also found that, during the latest three years, there were about over 500 comments in 16 
visitors’ books. According to his estimate based on the records, over 15,000 people had 
visited. 
 
Some visitor’s remarks were:   
 
“Chairman Mao, Chinese people will remember you always!” 
“Your sunshine illuminates every corner of the land forever!”  
“Chairman Mao is an immortal god.” 
“Look forward to see you, Chairman Mao, come back again!” 
“The Chairman, we haven’t seen you for 20 years. What a pleasure to meet you here today. 
Hope you could go on instructing our Chinese revolution, and could bless Chinese people’s 
happiness and well-being.”   
“Chairman Mao is more attractive and great than everyone who lives now.”  
“Chairman Mao, we working class need you!”  
“Chairman Mao, Chinese revolution cannot go on without you.” 
 
These remarks are characteristic of typical Chinese folk religion. Visual representations of 
Mao’s cult reveal even more similarity to Chinese folk religion. For example: images of 
deities are located in the house or in shrines; the domestic/family altar has a prominent 
location in the house; on the altar there are candlesticks and an incense censer; one or two 
kowtow cushions lie on the ground in front of altar, etc. For these Mao worshipers, God Mao 
is already a powerful deity with spiritual, protective and bewitching efficacy, and they pray to 
him for their safety and health. 
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Chapter 5  
An Alternative Understanding of Chinese Religious Culture 
Mao’s absolute and supreme authority pervaded virtually every aspect of the daily lives of 
Chinese people during the Cultural Revolution, and its manifestations, as I have shown, were 
full of religious features. However, this has been a controversial topic since then, as it is 
difficult to define the ambiguous character of Chinese religions. It is also very difficult to 
ignore the religious features of Mao’s cult.  
 
Arguments for the Religious Features of Mao’s Cult 
Ninian Smart‘s Mao is one of the earliest books which argued for the analogical features 
between Mao’s cult and a religion. For Smart, it was obvious that Mao’s cult contained 
analogically all the ingredients of a religion, which can be categorized into six dimensions: 
the doctrinal, the mythic, the ethical, the ritual, the experimental, and the social or 
institutional (Smart, 1974, p. 83). Therefore, it can be argued that “Maoism does function 
analogically as a religion for China” (Smart, 1974, p. 93). He also noticed that the CCP had 
taken many measures to restrain Chinese traditional religions, but he argues that “a 
religiously anti-religious zeal” in the Cultural Revolution “wanted to replace religion…” 
(Smart, 1974, p. 86). That is to say, the formation of the Mao’s Cult was based on rooting out 
its heresy by force, and that this also resembled the exclusiveness of religious beliefs. Smart 
also employed religious terms with respect to Maoism, such as “sacred rituals”, “an 
articulated and authoritative set of doctrines”, “evangelical morality”, “Maoist eschatology” 
etc. (Smart, 1974).  
 
The Italian writer, Alberto Moravia, mentioned before, associates the cult of Mao and the 
ubiquity of the Red Book with the traditional culture of Confucianism. Confucianism was the 
dominant ancient Chinese official religion, albeit that its definition as a religion is 
problematic 34. He argues that the cult of Mao during the Cultural Revolution was “the 
Confucianization of Marx’s thought” and “the Confucianization of Maoism”(Moravia, 1968, 
p. 39).  
                                                             
34 On the discussion on whether Confucianism is a religion or not, please refer to Yong Chen’s dissertation, “On the Rhetoric 
of Defining Confucianism as ‘a Religion’ ” (Chen, 2005).  
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Raymond Whitehead considers Maoism as “God’s saving power” in China (quoted in Janz, 
1998, p. 139); and Stefan R. Landsberger considers Mao as a Chinese traditional Kitchen 
God (Landsberger, 1996, 2002). Scholars who have the same views include Kitagawa (1974), 
MacInnis (1969), and Woo (1973), who “regard Maoism as a ‘religion’, a ‘quasi-religion’, or 
a ‘religion surrogate’ ” (Caldarola, 1982, p. 570) . 
 
Beside these, a current famous scholar who demonstrates clearly the religious aspects of 
Mao’s cult is Stefan R. Landsberger (Landsberger, 1996, 2002). His essay Mao as the Kitchen 
God: Religious Aspects of the Mao’s cult during the Cultural Revolution focuses on those 
propaganda pictures of Mao during the 1960s. He expatiates on how these pictures 
represented Mao as a brilliant hero and moral super model, and how these sacrosanct pictures 
were worshiped and replaced Chinese families’ previous worship of their ancestors. 
Comparing him with the Kitchen God who needs to report to a supreme god, Mao was 
already a superior being. Furthermore, unlike the picture of the Kitchen God, Mao’s portraits 
were sacrosanct and not allowed to be thrown away or contaminated. If they were, the person 
responsible could be convicted as a counter-revolutionary committing a sacrilegious act. 
Although Landsberger makes a penetrating analysis on the religious aspects of Mao’s cult, his 
central argument emphasizes the CCP’s hegemony over culture. 
 
However, religious aspects of Mao’s cult in this political mass movement still manifested 
quite explicit political connotations. That is the reason why there are some critiques of 
equating Maoism with religion. Critics commonly charge that Maoism should be counted as a 
political tactics at most. Raymond Pong and Carlo Caldarola explicitly object to “the 
definition of Maoism as a religion”, and state “it would be inaccurate to talk of the worship of 
Mao in the same sense as the worship of Buddha, the gods, or the ancestors” (Caldarola, 
1982, p 571). Other scholars agree that the cult of Mao was just one of the political tactics 
used by Mao (Bouc & Mao, 1977; Dittmer, 1980; Schram, 1984; Tsou, 1969). 
 
Therefore, some scholars used another halfway terminology --- Eric Voegelin’s political 
religion --- when they mentioned Mao’s cult (Goodin 1981; Hyden 1967; Myers 1989). As far 
as Voegelin’s understanding goes, a political religion is replete with cults, symbols, rituals 
and even violence.  
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Using a new concept to analyze Mao’s cult is an attempt to recognize these religious features, 
while differentiating the cult from traditional religions in ancient China. Although there were 
religious ritual activities during the Cultural Revolution, just as Zuo Jiping argued, “there is 
little difference between the political religion and the traditional religion of China” (Zuo, 
1991). And “…at the same time as it attempted to destroy traditional religious activities, the 
Chinese communist regime initiated and encouraged a new religion centered around Mao 
Zedong…” (Zuo, 1991).  
 
Emilio Gentile, the author of Politics as Religion (2006), analyzes and summarizes most of 
the foregoing arguments and descriptions about the sacralization of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the deification of Mao. As a conclusion, he argues that, 
  
The transformation of Maoism into a political religion, which is inherent in the 
ideological dogmatism and political monopoly of the Communist Party, resulted from 
an initiative from below, producing a politico-religious syncretism in which Maoist 
ideology mixed with Confucianism, Taoist mysticism, and popular religiosity 
(Gentile, 2006, p. 124). 
 
No matter how different the point of emphasis and the angle of analysis, all of these 
arguments reveal that the religious features in Mao’s cult cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, all 
these arguments are entangled in another problem: whether Mao’s cult is a religion or not. 
Moreover, thinking in terms of the western ideas on religion, China, obviously, is an 
unreligious/irreligious country. Compared with Western religions, it is reasonable to assume 
that Chinese people have lacked religious belief, and that ideologies with secularism and 
utilitarianism have been widely accepted and practiced throughout Chinese history. As we 
know, Chinese agricultural civilization urged people to consider ethics more important than 
religions. That is why western scholars consider that there is not a transcendent religion in 
China, and the majority of Chinese are non-religious, practical, and this-worldly, let alone 
such a modern and secular cult containing explicit political content. Obviously, this results in 
another more controversial issue: how to define a religious phenomenon in China, both for 
Chinese and foreign scholars; or, how you might use the word religion in a Chinese context.  
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The Uses of Words: Religion and Zong Jiao 
The word “religion” as it is used in China was imported by the Japanese from the west in the 
late 19th century. Japanese translated the English word “religion” into Chinese as Zong Jiao 
(宗教) during the late Tokugawa period 35 . As an exotic word，Zong Jiao has its own 
connotation in China, which is different from that of the western word ‘religion’. Putting 
aside the complexity of understanding the connotation of the word ‘religion’ in the west, it is 
necessary to clarify two questions regarding the status of today’s use of “Zong Jiao” in China.  
 
Firstly，the import of “Zong Jiao”, to a large extent, changed the traditional religious 
research situation which was based on a single religious perspective, such as Buddhism, or 
Daoism. According to a Chinese scholar, He Guanglu, since the word for religion, “Zong 
Jiao”, was introduced into China, “Chinese religious research has begun to treat various 
religions as a whole rationally and objectively…and so-called religious studies in China have 
grown up therefrom” (G. He, 2003). This point of view obviously follows from the 
understanding of Friedrich Max Müller, who considers that the science of religion should 
neither be based on a standpoint from one particular religion, nor object to other religions 
with its own doctrines. It should be dealt with by a scientific attitude. In this thesis, I would 
not discuss any specific religion. I would rather treat religion as a general social phenomenon 
that can be approached with a scientific attitude. 
 
Secondly, what the use of the word “Zong Jiao” means here relates to the actual use of this 
word in a certain social environment. In China, there are two levels of meaning in its use: one 
is on the academic or official level; the other is on the folk cultural level. These two levels are 
mutually related, but more importantly, mutually independent. In this thesis, to differentiate 
these two levels is a prerequisite/premise for further research. 
 
For instance, the queries about Chinese religious culture, which are put forward by western 
scholars, come mainly from the following three arguments: the first one is that, except for 
Buddhism, there is no transcendent religion in China; the second argument is that, in modern 
China, anti-religion became the cultural mainstream since the New Cultural Movement36; and 
                                                             
35 The last shogunate in Japan (1603–1867), founded by Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616). The shogunate was followed by the 
restoration of imperial power under Meiji Tenno.  
36 The New Cultural Movement was a Chinese Enlightenment during 1917-1921, which grew out of the disillusionment with 
traditional Chinese culture by some brilliant intellects and scholars, like Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, Li Dazhao, etc.    
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the third is that, after the founding of the PRC, the Chinese people were instilled by the 
governmental propaganda of atheism, which induced them to become non-religious.  
 
The crux of these arguments lies in how to distinguish two levels of the situation of the use of 
“Zong Jiao” in China. At the first level, the theories involved are theology and philosophy, 
which are far more reached than what common Chinese people can realize. At the second 
level, the criticism of religion mostly came from intellectuals and politicians, such as Hu Shi, 
Chen Duxiou etc. The common people were still living in their own set of beliefs and 
practices. Likewise, for the third argument, the fact that atheism as the dominant ideology of 
the People’s Republic of China really gives people the feeling that China is/was an 
unreligious country. However, most folk religious customs are still popular in the lives of 
common people.  
 
That is to say, the word Zong Jiao, rather than an obscure term in need of technical definition, 
is a commonly used and widely understood term in the Chinese people’s everyday language,. 
Indeed, when Chinese people use the word Zong Jiao, most of the time they use the word 
unreflectively, as if it were completely self-defining. Therefore, two levels of the situation of 
the use of Zong Jiao should be distinguished in this thesis. I will call the first level as the top-
level religion, and the other level as the bottom-level religion.  
 
Thirdly, it is inevitable to discuss the Chinese religious problem through western frameworks 
of thought, if we have to use the English word ‘religion’ to translate Zong Jiao. If we are 
rooted in this way of thinking, it is sometimes very hard to say that, in China, the so called 
non-religious phenomenon is really non-religious, and vice versa. Obviously, when we use 
the word ‘religion’, and subsequently Zong Jiao, our research has have been contaminated 
covertly by a western way of thinking, and even a western values system. As Fitzgerald says, 
“western concepts…can so easily project distorted meanings onto the data” from other non-
western societies (Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 9). 
 
However, if we drop this word in a Chinese context, it is hard for us to find another word that 
is more precise and more convenient for our discussion. In terms of the reality of our 
research, it makes no sense to delete this word totally from our analytical categories. This 
problem has already been considered by some Chinese scholars who specialize in Chinese 
culture. As Jiang Qing put it, the words Zong Jiao and ‘religion’, to be more exact, are more 
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to be borrowed than to be used in China (Jiang, 2004). That is to say, although we have to use 
the word as a general category, we still need to put it in a specific historical and social 
context.  
 
If we borrow the word religion to replace Zong Jiao in the Chinese context, the research on 
Chinese religious culture could not overlook the connotation of the word ‘religion’ in the 
west. My argument here is to suggest that the connotation of religion in the Chinese religious 
culture is based on the western religious culture, but has a different emphasis, which will be 
interpreted further in the next part below. Therefore, we need not avoid the western 
conception totally, but we do have to make a distinction. If there is no need to stress the 
difference between religion and Zong Jiao, then these two words in this thesis can be used 
interchangeably.  
 
The Uses of the Word Religion: From Western to Non-western Cultures 
The research on the connotation of the word ‘religion’ in the west is also complicated. The 
current profusion of data and materials about these debates make it almost impossible for any 
individual to deal with them thoroughly and exhaustively.  
 
The word ‘religion’ is a modern English word, whose etymological origins have been obscure 
and ambiguous. In An etymological dictionary of the English language by Professor Skeat, he 
explains that “Religion, piety, the performance of duties to God and man, (F.-L.?) in early use. 
Spelt religion … Allied to religens, fearing the gods, pious. [And therefore not derived from 
religare, to bind.] The opposite of negligens, negligent … Allied also to di-ligens, diligent ...” 
(Skeat, 1910). Walde (1938) connects the word religion with the idea of choice and interest. 
The earlier etymological sense, if traced back far enough, derives religion from relegere, to 
go through and over again in reading and thought; or from relegare, to bind (Hoyt, 1912). 
Also, it is worthy of note that, “In the Authorized Version, religion is used of outward forms 
rather than of the inner spirit … Religion was so used by Jeremy Taylor (c.1613-1637)” as 
meaning the rites and ceremonies of religion …” (Hoyt, 1912).  
 
From these original etymological senses, the earliest use of the word religion could be 
reduced to two major dimensions (see Table 2.1). And at least, at the earliest time, one can 
find that neither of the two dimensions was over-emphasized. It is not an original way to 
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construct the word religion like this, but the hypothesis here is that these two dimensions are 
both essential aspects of the future religious culture, no matter how the meaning of this word 
changes afterward, and no matter how obscure the meaning of this word gets.  
 
External Dimensions Inner Dimension 
as external restrictions; 
as actual functions; 
as outward forms; 
as a practice of reverence; 
as inner spiritual experience; 
as an attitude of life37; 
as reverence for gods; 
 
FIGURE 7 Dimensions of the earliest uses of the word ‘religion’ in the west 
 
For instance, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, a scholar of the comparative study of religion, 
manages to replace the word ‘religion’ with two other concepts. If one analyzes his 
consideration of the word ‘religion’, you will find that the lives of religious men were 
dichotomized by Smith as existing in two worlds: “the mundane realm” and “the transcendent 
realm”(Smith, 1964, p. 139). Based on this dichotomy Smith (1964) replaces ‘religion’ with 
two separate concepts, “cumulative tradition” and “faith” (Smith, 1964, p. 175). Obviously, 
the former belongs to the external dimension, and the latter belongs to the internal dimension. 
In other words, even though Smith seeks to drop the word ‘religion’, the two dimensions are 
still there. 
 
A similar analysis can be found in one of the lectures of Friedrich Max Müller, who in 1870 
presented two different senses in the use of the word ‘religion’. For Müller, in one sense, we 
meant religion as “a body of doctrines handed down by tradition”; and in the other sense, we 
meant religion as “a mental faculty or disposition which , independent of, nay, in spite of 
sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names and under 
varying disguises”(Müller, 2005, pp. 13-14). However, in my opinion, Müller put his special 
emphasis on the second sense, which he coined as a new phrase “the faculty of faith” (Müller, 
2005, p. 14).  
 
From these earliest etymological senses, it is hard to say whether these, which related to 
                                                             
37 See Smith Wilfred Cantwell (1964:23-26) for an elaboration of this theme.  
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religion, were the human inner disposition or not. If these were the human inner disposition, 
that means the inner feeling/experience of human being, and even those corresponding 
outward acts of them, were both ineluctable in their lives, as well as their society. Whereas, if 
these were not human dispositions, then there must be something outside of them to 
prompt/drive people to feel and act like that. However, the result may be the same, i.e. 
something related to religion that still existed. Anyway, it could also be inferred that the word 
‘religion’ was used to refer to something objective existing in the human’s lives and societies. 
 
However, how can one be sure that so-called religion is really a religion? Similarly, how can 
one be sure that so-called non-religion is really not a religion? The questions have become 
prominent along with the spread of the word ‘religion’.  
 
In the next few centuries, as the word ‘religion’ evolved, the explanations and connotations of 
this word have been getting more and more complicated. On the one hand, more detailed and 
systematic assignments of theological, philosophical, ethical/moral and sociological 
meanings are attributed to this word. Moreover, these explanations or definitions are not only 
put forward by a multiplicity of religious believers from their given cultural traditions, but 
also by those outside tradition such as religious observers or critics (Smith, 1964, p. 16). 
Therefore, the precise definition of religion is seemingly almost an impossible task 
(Hutchison, 1991; Idinopulos, 1998; Jones, 2007; Larue, 2003). For instance, John A. 
Hutchison, in his book “Paths of Faith”, points out this difficulty and provides his own 
understanding:  
Formal definitions of religion are as numerous, as various, and often as mutually 
conflicting as there are students of religion. Often such definitions illustrate the 
oriental parable of the blind men describing the elephant, each taking hold of part of 
the beast and defining the whole in terms of this part. Like the elephant, religion is a 
large and complex phenomenon. In this connection, some historians of religion 
question or reject the word religion as a distortion of the form of experience it seeks to 
communicate. Several of the world's major languages lack any word that can be 
adequately translated as "religion." The common noun religion imputes a unity or 
homogeneity of experience that many observers believe does not exist (Hutchison, 
1991).  
 
Just as Hutchison said, faced with this seemingly insoluble dilemma, some scholars began to 
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doubt the necessity of a definition of religion. For example, as early as 1964, Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, as mentioned above, propounded that we should “drop” the term religion, 
and replace it with two separate concepts, “cumulative tradition” and “faith”, to express what 
we call “religion”(Smith, 1964, p. 141).  
 
Compared to those who contrive to provide a precise definition of religion, Smith, is bold 
enough to “deconstruct” the word religion. He himself calls this “deconstruction” “a new 
conceptual apparatus or theoretical framework” (Smith, 1964, p. 175). No matter whether his 
“deconstruction” is worthy of agreement38, what is more important is his elaboration by 
which he explains why he provides such an evasive-seeming device to “outflank” his 
problem.  
 
First, from Smith’s argument, it is obvious that it is the pluralism of religion that warrants 
dropping the word ‘religion’. He hammers in the inadequacy of the word ‘religion’ for some 
non-western societies, “especially in the oriental religions [in which] it is almost impossible 
to think of "religion" as we moderns are wont to think of it” (Rackman, 1965).  
 
It is true, as Smith mentioned, there is not the equivalent word for the English word ‘religion’ 
in many non-western contexts. Also, in the newest edition of Oxford Classical Dictionary, 
you cannot find an entry “religion, terms relating to” anymore. Instead, one finds a series of 
entries about religion following a certain determiner (Hornblower & Spawforth, 2009). That 
is to say, the word ‘religion’ should not be considered as a general word, but a concrete word 
used in specific concrete social environments.  
 
Smith uses a word “reification” to describe the modern evolution of religion. He points out 
that before reification, the word/concept religion signified “inner personal orientation” 
(Smith, 1964, p. 51). However, gradually, “we move from considering this personal quality 
of life to thinking rather of an organized system” (Smith, 1964, p. 51). That is what he means 
by “reification”: “mentally making religion into a thing, gradually coming to conceive it as an 
objective systematic entity” (Smith, 1964, p. 50). In my opinion, the process of reification 
denotes a process in which the emphasis transfers from the inner to the external dimension. 
Or rather, since the word ‘religion’ appears in the non-western context, the word ‘religion’ 
                                                             
38 Actually, Wilfred Cantwell Smith also gave up his idea of replacing religion with the two other concepts later.  
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has begun to emphasize the external dimension more than before.  
 
Similarly, another scholar Timothy Fitzgerald agrees with Smith that the category “religion” 
has no useful role to play as a scholarly analytic tool. He argues “the word ‘religion’…is 
analytically redundant” and “it picks out nothing distinctive and it clarifies nothing. It merely 
distorts the field” (Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 17). Likewise, let us neglect his argument of using the 
word religion as a mystified analytical category. What I am concerned with here is his 
discussion of the transformation meaning of the word ‘religion’. 
 
In his book, The Ideology of Religious Studies, in order to prove the analytical usefulness of 
the word ‘religion’, Fitzgerald heavily emphasizes the distinction between the theological 
uses of the word ‘religion’ from the non-theological uses of the word. For Fitzgerald, the 
concept of religion and the so called religious study is disguised by western ideological 
loading, to be specific, liberal ecumenical theology in traditional Christian culture 
(Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 6). The relatively indiscriminate use of the word ‘religion’, especially in 
cross-cultural analysis, therefore means “a part of a historical ideological process” 
(Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 8). Fitzgerald’s arguments actually provide a transferring process of the 
meaning of religion in a non-western context, in which the belief in Christian culture has 
been transferred from the supernatural to some secular practices and institutions, politically 
and ideologically.  
 
For non-western societies, following Fitzgerald’s argument, this process involves an 
imposition. However, if we view the issue from another perspective, then the importation of 
the word ‘religion’ from the west, actually means the word itself has a more secular and even 
ideological loading in those non-western societies.  
 
Furthermore, what I would like to emphasize here is that, with the export of the word 
‘religion’ from western to non-western cultures, there is an unexpected and hidden tendency 
to use the word religion in a more secular sense, i.e., the word ‘religion’ has begun to 
emphasise the external dimension more than before.   
 
The problem here, if the meaning of the word ‘religion’ has been changed so much, is 
whether we should find better alternatives by which to research problems in non-western 
societies. However, although it is the pluralism in different non-western contexts that made 
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some scholars begin to reconsider this problem, the adjective “religious” still survived in their 
writings. It actually indicates that the obscurity of the word ‘religion’, even the intractable 
problem of defining the word, cannot wipe out the distinct and explicit existence of religious 
phenomena in non-western societies. Therefore, maybe we need to rethink the definition of 
the word ‘religion’, when it is imported into some non-western societies.  
 
If the use of a word has to imply the true or something objectively existing, the definition of 
this word should be precise. What is true? And what can be considered to exist objectively? 
To answer these questions one may have to go into the ontology of philosophy. According to 
the classical works from Hume or Kant, written some centuries ago, but not out-dated, proved 
that what is the thing-in-itself and how it exists, are both unknowable. If this is true, how can 
one define a word with explicit certainty?  
 
Richard Robinson, in his book Definition, says,  
 
Have definitions a truth value? The search for definitions in Plato’s dialogues is represented 
as a search for a certain kind of true statement, and when proposed definitions rejected it is 
usually because they are held to be false statement. But today it is often maintained that a 
definition cannot be either true or false, because it is not a statement but rather a command, 
not a proposition but a proposal (Robinson, 1950, p. 5). 
 
In my opinion, this is a kind of pragmatic, as well as useful, attitude about definition. In many 
non-western contexts, it is better to use, or borrow this word to elucidate some certain specific 
phenomena, than to get entangled in what the word exactly means.  
 
Therefore, we do not need to abandon the word ‘religion’, but this does not mean that we 
have to use this word to process our research problems. To reduce unnecessary controversies, 
we prefer to use the adjective “religious”. 
 
To sum up, it will prove to be of little avail to indulge in speculations on such questions, if 
based on the Western conceptual framework. Since the 19th century，the construction of 
western modernity and its colonial expansion, have led most non-western developing 
countries to a “standard” model of development, economically and culturally. Therefore, 
analysis of issues by western theories and conceptual frameworks has spontaneously become 
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the main approach among non-western scholars. Generally, for non-western societies, the 
notions and values of so-called normative modernity have evolved from hegemonies of 
western ideology and cultures, but have been disguised as authorities of knowledge, and 
furthermore as a universalism of general values. Whereas, if we view the issue from another 
angle and take into account the Chinese social and cultural context, we might find that the 
modern cult of Mao is just an alternative to the Western style/model. 
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Chapter 6 
An Alternative Religious Cult 
The Rejection of Tradition vs. Traditional Religious Features 
As outlined above, modernity in China is filled with various paradoxes. But the biggest 
paradox of early Chinese modernization lies in the period from the May Fourth Movement to 
the 1970s: the adoption of western modern ideas accompanied by the drastic rejection of 
traditional culture. However these efforts failed to make the early PRC a modern country 
with democracy and freedom. Rather, under the cover of Marxism and socialist democracy, a 
modern dictatorship merged with traditional culture, and the Chinese people cultivated a new 
belief and raised a new deity for the country. It became the distinct feature of the early 
modernization of the PRC. The Cultural Revolution of the 1960s can be seen as the climax of 
this alternative modernization.  
 
As both an intensive and extreme manifestation of Chinese modernization, Mao’s cult during 
the Cultural Revolution also exposed conflicts and problems within Chinese modernization 
(Liu, 1996, p. 387). In his analysis, Liu Xiaofeng identifies several features of the Chinese 
modern social environment before the Cultural Revolution, in which the PRC under the 
leadership of the CCP had already been, to a large extent, a modern nation state with its own 
characteristics (ibid). However, in order to emphasize the modern features of the Cultural 
Revolution, Liu disagrees that there wasn’t any inevitability to the outbreak of this 
movement. It occurred because of some structural dysfunctions rooted in Chinese 
modernization. Moreover, Liu also disagrees that there were any traditional factors mixed 
into this movement (ibid). 
 
However, in my view, Liu’s explanation fails to explain why the structural dysfunctions in the 
Cultural Revolution contained considerable similarity to those in the Chinese traditional 
political and religious culture, which clearly belonged to the “feudal” period.  
 
Meanwhile, some people seemed to believe that the consequence of a series of upheavals, 
such as the dethroning of the emperor, and the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China, should lead to a modern China with democracy and freedom. For instance, the 
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traditional religious culture was attacked as “feudal” superstition, and it seemed as though the 
new China was already in the process of “the disenchantment of the world” --- one of the 
signs of modern secularization (Weber, 1978a, p.155). Unfortunately, the issue is not as 
straightforward as that.  
 
Traditional cultures, as well as capitalist cultures, which are the opposite of advanced modern 
socialist and communist cultures, were attacked as backward cultures which hindered the 
development of modernization. In fact, for most Chinese people it was not easy to break 
away from the traditional way of thinking; the behavior of most Chinese people was still 
dominated by a tradition that was non-reflexive. Under the flag of socialism and communism, 
the CCP and its leader Chairman Mao, actually occupied the position of an unchallengeable 
supremacy, just like an emperor. Similarly, his followers were, outwardly at least, receptive to 
this kind of authority and rule. This is precisely the paradox of the confrontation and tension 
between traditional culture and modernity. 
 
Therefore, when we look at the process of Chinese modernization, my suggestion here is that 
we should not ignore factors of Chinese traditional culture; we need to take the continuity of 
Chinese traditional culture into account. That is to say, although what happened in the 
Cultural Revolution was undoubtedly an accompaniment to the rise of the modern state, 
simultaneously, the cult of Mao also was a consequence of the ubiquity of traditional culture; 
especially the rituals of the cult especially were filled up with Chinese traditional cultural 
elements. For instance, Mao’s portrait was always above the home altar, where their ancestral 
tablets had been placed before.  
 
The name “cultural revolution” and its implied sense of “cultural criticism” easily lead people 
to mistake it as a movement only concerned with cultural issues. In fact, the Cultural 
Revolution was not only a movement focusing on culture itself, but more on social-political 
purposes, in particular on power struggles. The cultural criticism was just used an excuse for 
further strengthening the dominant position of the ideology of the CCP. Meanwhile, in the 
elimination of the traditional culture, as well as a capitalist culture, the major goal was to 
eradicate any other different cultures and ideologies different from the ideology of the CCP. 
The CCP had no tolerance for other ideologies in that period, in the same way as religious 
sects would not tolerate heretics. For example, Mao’s Red Guards “perpetrated the worst 
horrors against religious praxis ---killing and maiming, forcing religious individuals into acts 
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against their beliefs, invading their homes to destroy any vestiges of religion” (Fowler and 
Fowler 2008, p. 251). Obviously, all other cultures and beliefs were forced out by the 
ideology of the new party, which, I am claiming, eventually had become a religion with 
Chinese characteristics for the people at that time.   
 
It is beyond words to show how absurd and ludicrous it was when the political movement 
became a show of religious fanaticism during the Cultural Revolution. The tragic “ten year’s 
catastrophe” was far beyond everyone’s imagination39, similar to the way Giddens compares 
modernity to an adventure experiment beyond human’s control: 
 
On the global level, therefore, modernity has become experimental. We are all, willy-
nilly, caught up in a grand experiment, which is at the one time our doing --- as human 
agents --- yet to an imponderable degree outside of our control. It is not an experiment 
in the laboratory sense, because we do not govern the outcomes within fixed 
parameters – it is more like a dangerous adventure, in which each of us has to 
participate whether we like it or not (Giddens, 1994, p. 59).  
 
Admittedly, the Cultural Revolution, as an adventure of modernity, was also a grand 
experiment, the outcome of which was unknown which also retained the potential for bright 
furture for the Chinese, who at that time devoted themselves to seeking the way to their 
liberation and modernization. But the venture failed. Shortly after the outbreak of the Cultural 
Revolution, almost all of the government and administrative organs became dysfunctional, 
and the whole country faced the imminent danger of disintegration40. 
 
Thus, it is clear, that when modern democracy was mixed with such traditional elements, 
Chinese modernity and modernization had already moved away from the western trajectory 
of modernity. The most distinctive feature of early Chinese modernization, from the 
Enlightenment to the Cultural Revolution, is the politicization of culture and everyday life. 
 
                                                             
39 During this turbulent decade, the whole of China was flung into confusion, and “millions of people were killed, 
committed suicide, or suffered unspeakable hardships both physically and psychologically”. See Chang, Tony H. 1999. China 
during the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976: A Selected Bibliography of English Language Works. London: Greenwood Press., 
p vii. 
40 At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, schools were closed, and organized students group, the Red Guards, attacked 
their teachers, and then “capitalist roaders” in positions of authority, who were normally top party officials. Their violence 
affected all aspects of public life and its development. Subsequent factionalism within the Red Guards resulted in mass 
"physical struggle” (武斗) all over the country. All of these left the country in chaos. 
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Traditional Religious Features vs. Mao’s Cult 
As mentioned above, traditional religions were restricted as superstitions of an ignorant 
populace during the Cultural Revolution. However, another ideology with religious features, 
Mao’s cult, penetrated into the everyday lives of Chinese people. It is worth noting that all 
these religious features came from Chinese traditional religions, as explained in the following 
discussion. 
 
For Chinese traditional religions, it is a fact that various religious activities in Chinese 
traditional society constitute a vague and ambiguous system. It seems that Chinese religions 
lack organization and a theological system. However, compared with western religions, 
Chinese religions are better analyzed by a structure-function approach --- rather than a 
theological approach. According to the well-known research on Chinese religions from C. K. 
Yang, religions in Chinese society can be divided into two forms: 
 
Applying the structure-function approach to Chinese society, we can discern two 
structural forms of religion. One is institutional religion, which has a system of 
theology, rituals, and organization of its own, independent of other secular social 
institutions. It is a social institution by itself, having its own basic concepts and its 
own structural system. The other is diffused religion, with its theology, rituals, and 
organization intimately merged with the concepts and structure of secular 
institutions and other aspects of the social order (Yang, 1961, p. 20). 
 
So far, Yang’s classification is the most valuable reference for understanding the features of 
religious activities in Chinese society. As in his classification, a notable feature of diffused 
religion is that some religious activities cannot exist in the society without “the concepts and 
structure of secular institutions and other aspects of the social order”. Furthermore, his 
research also shows that ‘diffused religion’, has a higher popularity in Chinese society. This 
is evidenced by the following data provided by Yang about the distribution of cults in a small 
county in China (Yang, 1961, p. 24). 
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FIGURE 8  The Proportion extent of Popular Religion in Chinese Society 
 
Nevertheless, as a complex and syncretic system, there are various practices and various 
“Shen” (神，god or goddess) in the ‘diffused religion’. It is reasonable to classify the 
system of these “Shens” into three categories, nature worship, ancestor worship, and the 
worship of saints.  
 
With reference to nature worship, in my understanding, there are three sources for these 
Shen. The first one is the personification and deification of Heaven (or Heaven-and-Earth), 
the highest level in the system of Chinese religion. During the feudal period, one approach 
of the imperial power was to monopolize the right to worship Heaven by the Emperor. 
Actually, all emperors were alleged to be “the son of the Heaven”, whose ruling was blessed 
by Heaven. All of these were later theorized by a Confucian scholar, Dong Zhongshu during 
the Han Dynasty, to form the legitimacy of a monarch, known as “interactions between 
Heaven and Mankind”. Since then, the sacralization of political leaders became a part of 
official belief through the worship of Heaven, and the emperor was viewed as the only 
representative of Heaven. 
 
The second category of Shens came from the personification of some abstract concepts of 
people’s secular wishes, such as “Cai Shen” (财神，God of Wealth), “Shou Shen”(寿星，
God of Longevity), and “Song Zi Liangliang” (生子娘娘，Goddess of Fertility). The third 
category of Shens were created to take charge of some important social or family activities, 
such as “Zao Shen”(灶神, God of Kitchen), “Tu Di Gong”(土地公, God of the earth), and 
“Chen Huang”(城隍, God of City).  
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As for the ancestor worship, it was a ritual practice to reinforce the unity of family and 
lineage. For those living family members, their deceased ancestors possessed the ability to 
bless the peace of the whole family and the fortune of the living. As for the Shens in Saints 
worship (圣人崇拜, shen-ren chong-bai), they normally originated from some historical 
figures, who were venerated for their brilliance and virtues, the famous one being “Guan 
Gong”(关公, God of War).  
 
In addition, it was a very common phenomenon for a tablet of “Tian Di Jun Qin Shi”41 (天地
君亲师) to be placed for worship in the homes of Chinese people after the later period of the 
Ming Dynasty (Xu, 2006). This was another worship system existing in Chinese ‘diffused’ 
popular religion, which originated from Chinese primeval religion, but then blended into 
Confucianism42. According to a Chinese scholar, Xu Zi’s research, “Tian Di Jun Qin Shi”, 
was both a kind of religious belief, and also a sort of symbol of ethical significance. It 
signified a set of value orientations, which were connected to the reverence toward a sort of 
transcendence coming from nature, the sovereign, the ancestors, and teachers/mentors.  
 
As far as the objects of worship are concerned, this system syncretized the above three 
categories of religious worship, which are nature worship, ancestor worship and saints 
worship. During the feudal period, patriarchal relationships and the “feudal” ideology were 
intensified by this system of worship. 
 
According to the above sketchy map of the religious features of Chinese religions, the cult of 
Mao is understandable in the context of Chinese religious culture. On the whole, when Mao 
was an object of worship, his status was respectively similar to “Tian Di Jun Qin Shi”, which 
syncretized all categories of religious worship in Chinese ‘diffused religion’.  
 
First of all, during the Cultural Revolution, one of the most popular slogans was that 
“Chairman Mao is the red sun in our hearts”, which later became a name for a song of 
hymns to Mao. Also, a propaganda poster with Mao’s portrait amid red rays of the sun, was 
captioned “All living things depend on the sun for their growth”. Mao was treated as great as 
                                                             
41 Literally, “Tian” means the Heaven; “Di” means the Earth; “Jun” means sovereign; “Qin” means blood relatives or 
ancestors and “Shi” means teacher or great masters.  
42 There is not explicit textual evidence to show the exact time when “Tian Di Jun Qin Shi” blended into Confucianism. 
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the sun, and as important as the sun. And because the significance of Mao could not be 
expressed in words, he was symbolized as the sun. Moreover, when people were informed 
about Mao’s death, most of them felt the bottom had dropped out of their worlds, just as if 
“the heaven fell” out of their worlds. Symbolizing Mao as the red sun counted as a kind of 
nature worship. . 
 
On the other hand, Mao was also worshiped as a supreme emperor in modern China, and his 
authority was absolutely beyond dispute for a long time. Not only was he a leader in the 
traditional monarchical way, but also most of his colleagues, not to mention most ordinary 
people, considered loyalty to Mao equaled devotion to the country. In other words, his status 
as the emperor was one of reasons for the rise of the cult of Mao. 
 
Furthermore, during the Cultural Revolution, for most followers, the relationship to Mao 
was closer than that to their parents. At that time, in almost all families, the tablets of their 
ancestors were replaced by the statue or the portrait of Mao. As it was forbidden to burn 
incense to Mao, which was viewed as traditional superstition, the ritual of worship was 
changed to “ask for instruction in the morning and make a report in the evening”.  
 
However, the connotation of Mao’s cult shifted after the 1990s. The rituals of Mao’s cult 
became more similar to the worship of the deceased ancestor, and then his statues and 
portraits were worshiped by burning incense at home or in some temples. Moreover, when 
Mao’s image was hung in a taxi, it functioned as a talisman to ward off evil and calamities 
and bring good luck.  
 
Finally, Mao had become the spiritual teacher because he was recognized as the primary 
source of official ideology. It was his blend with Marxism with Chinese characteristics that 
guided the Chinese people to successfully revolt against imperialism and feudalism, and then 
to enter into a specific process of Chinese socialist modernization. During the Cultural 
Revolution, one of Mao’s titles 43  was “great teacher”, and his thought was seen to be 
possessed of miraculous powers. It was reported in official publications that one of the 
miraculous functions of Mao’s thought was to cure many diseases44. Moreover, the famous 
                                                             
43 Mao’s title during the Cultural Revolution was called the “Four Greats”: the Great Leader, Great Helmsman, Great 
Supreme Commander and Great Teacher. 
44 One of the reports from the  Liberation Army Daily of the thirteenth of May, 1969, said that some deaf-mutes could 
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little red books, Mao’s quotations from his works, were published and distributed free to 
everyone, and became the guide book for everything in the people’s daily lives. 
 
To sum up the above arguments, although what happened during the Cultural Revolution is 
an episode in the rise of the modern state, the cult of Mao is a consequence of the 
pervasiveness of traditional culture, especially the traditional religious cultural elements. On 
the other hand, although the religious features of Mao’s cult are very obvious, they defy easy 
classification. One important reason for this is syncretism, which is one of the features of 
traditional Chinese religious culture. Even though the communist movement in China, as 
one of the Chinese efforts of pursuing modernity, has worked hard to break from the 
“backward” and “feudal” tradition of Chinese culture, such traditions have persisted and 
become part of the modernity created by the communist movement.  From this perspective, 
Mao’s cult can be understood as part of an alternative modernity created by the Chinese 
communist movement. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
speak again by learning Mao’s thought; another report of People Daily published on Tenth of August, 1971, reported that 
Mao’s thought cured some people with mental disease.  
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Chapter 7  
An Alternative “Non-religious” Cult 
Obviously, there exist sharp distinctions between the old Mao cult and the new one. Two 
scholars, Zhou and Yao, argue that the old Mao cult, which happened during the Cultural 
Revolution, was a variation of the traditional worship of ancestors, whereas the new one was 
the imitation of the traditional worship of supernatural beings. So, the roles of Mao in the 
cults of the two periods are also different. In the old cult, Mao was respected as a father of all 
the people in China. Chinese Confucian culture attaches much significance to the image of 
the father as the absolute authority in the state and families. However, in today’s Mao’s cult, 
Mao is treated as a deity or an apotropaic symbol (Zhou & Yao, 2003).  
 
However, in my opinion, the biggest difference between the old Mao’s cult and the new one 
lies in the manifestation of their religious features. The old cult was accompanied by an 
asserted atheism and the absolute rejection of unreason. And at the same time, through 
destroying traditional culture, the religious features of the old Mao cult were a forbidden and 
dangerous topic at that time. Whereas the new cult is throwing this off, revealing more 
religious features, although there still exist some non-religious Mao’s cults at the same time.  
 
No matter how different they are, these traditional religious features have had a profound 
impact on Chinese modernization. Furthermore, it is reasonable to say that, rather than 
declining in the process of modernization, traditional elements are on the rise in present day 
Chinese society (L. Sun, 1985). However, Sun’s argument that modernity in China only exists 
as an insubstantial or vague semblance, because of the persistence of tradition as a deep 
underlying structure in Chinese culture is still open for discussion. The deep structure in 
Chinese culture and the persistence of tradition should be regarded as the root/origin of the 
Chinese alternative modernity.  
 
With the combination of the traditional and the elements of modernity, the new Mao’s cult 
shows more symbolization and contains more connotations, than the previous inflexible and 
zealous forms. It is also noteworthy that in the new cult in the post-Mao era, secularism and 
utilitarianism are more apparent than in the old one. In the new cult, Mao is more a symbol 
rather than a respected deceased leader. 
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Mao’s Cult as Dao Tong  
It is reasonable to say that the above trend has been reversed since Deng Xiaoping came into 
power at the end of the 1970s, after which China opened another new epoch of 
modernization. The dilemma of how to evaluate the previous Chairman Mao loomed large 
within the CCP. However, it seemed that Deng Xiaoping already had an idea of how to deal 
with this thorny problem. 
 
In 1980, Deng Xiaoping had an interview with the famous Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci. 
When Deng was asked whether Mao's portrait above Tiananmen Gate would be kept there, 
his answer was explicit: “Mao’s portrait above Tiananmen Gate will be kept there forever”. 
And he told Fallaci that "we shall not do to Mao what Khrushchev did to Stalin" (Z. Wu & 
Yu, 2007). However, Deng did not evade the problem of “Mao’s mistakes” during the 
Cultural Revolution. He said:  
 
In evaluating his merits and mistakes, we hold that his mistakes were only secondary. 
What he did for the Chinese people can never be erased. In our hearts we Chinese will 
always cherish him as a founder of our Party and our state (ibid). 
 
A year later, the official evaluation of Mao was made by the Chinese Communist Party on 
June 27th, 1981. At the CCP’s Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, they 
passed the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding 
of the People's Republic of China", in which it states:  
 
Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary, 
strategist and theorist. It is true that he made gross mistakes during the "cultural 
revolution", but, if we judge his activities as a whole, his contributions to the Chinese 
revolution far outweigh his mistakes. His merits are primary and his errors secondary. 
He rendered indelible meritorious service in founding and building up our Party and the 
Chinese People's Liberation Army, in winning victory for the cause of liberation of the 
Chinese people, in founding the People's Republic of China and in advancing our 
socialist cause. He made major contributions to the liberation of the oppressed nations 
of the world and to the progress of mankind. 
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This historical judgment for Mao is commonly known as his “mistakes amounted to only 
30% and his achievements to 70%”. Since then, by emphasizing the importance of the market 
economy, Deng succeed in turning people’s attention towards the question of how to earn 
money. Obviously, the promotion of Mao was replaced by the promotion of the policy of 
reform and opening-up. Although official propaganda went quite, Mao and Maoism were not 
negated in general by the CCP. Obviously, the CCP could not wholly detach themselves from 
Mao and Mao’s thought, the significance of which is still a matter of importance in the 
political legitimacy of their rule. This is similar to the traditional Confucians maintenance of 
their “Dao Tong” (道统), the meaning is orthodoxy) to improve the legitimacy of their rule. 
 
Dao-tong (道统), or Confucian orthodoxy, is an important Confucian concept, which means 
the orthodox system of Confucian values. In terms of its social-political meaning, the 
character of Dao Tong is manifested as a certain cultural-psychological identity, the orthodox 
ideology for organizing and regulating society. Thus, Dao Tong is beneficial for the cohesion 
of the nation. As Dao Tong is equal to orthodoxy, it possesses the power of self-evident 
authority and sanctity (J. Zheng, 2001). Thus Dao Tong has therefore also been the legitimacy 
for the rule of every ancient dynasty.  
 
Even though it was the emperors who possessed the real political power and controlled the 
state machinery in traditional China, the legitimacy of the emperor’s rule would not have 
been recognized without the support from Dao Tong. Thus, in Chinese history, when an 
emperor ascended the throne, besides the sacralization provided by his own blood lineage, 
every emperor had to pledge himself to the orthodox in order to justify his rule (Zhao 2005, 
p. 17).   
 
Mao was the founding father of the PRC, and the most vital figure laying the foundations for 
the prestige of the CCP among the Chinese people. Although widespread dismay over the 
chaos of the Cultural Revolution had resulted in a deep "crisis of faith" among the people 
after the “ten years catastrophe”, the prestige of Mao had remained supreme throughout 
China. If Mao and his thoughts had been totally negated officially, that would have meant that 
the rule of the CCP would have completely failed. 
 
Keeping the shining image of Mao signifies the keeping of orthodoxy within the society in 
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China; keeping the orthodoxy in society signifies the control of the discourse of power, and 
thereby the maintenance of the legitimacy of CCP rule. And, until today, there are still many 
forbidden areas in discussion about Mao. According to a Chinese scholar Xiao Yanzhong, the 
bottom line of today’s Chinese academic research on Mao can only reach “sub-official-
ideology” (Xiao, 2005). In other words, compared with researchers before, Chinese scholars 
have been given freer rein, but they still need to pay attention to some taboos in their 
research.  
 
Therefore, in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, you cannot find anything that 
compromises the lofty image of Mao, except for his only mistake - the Cultural Revolution. 
Deng Xiaoping and even subsequent party leaders still need to rely on Mao’s prestige and 
achievement to maintain the ascendency of the authority of the CCP. 
 
Between Socialism and Capitalism 
After more than 20 years of development, there are many new features and varieties of 
Chinese modernization. Especially from the 1990s, some startling and unexpected 
transformations have occurred in the process of Chinese development towards its own 
version of modernity. 
 
As we know, after the fierce struggle of the Tiananmen event in June of 1989 45 , the 
government of the CCP encountered unprecedented pressure from the western world. Several 
months later, a Romanian anti-communist riot and revolution broke out at the end of 1989 
and Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was shot by a firing squad on Christmas Day. Two 
years later, more shocking news came to the Chinese, which was that the Soviet Union had 
broken up after a few years of liberalization. Political upheavals in Eastern Europe raised 
serious doubts about the future of China, which had a shared ideology with the old USSR. 
Would China ever break up the way the Soviet Union did? And what would be next for the 
Chinese government, as well as the socialist society in China?  
 
It is obvious that a succession of events raised fears of a collapse of the regime within the 
CCP, and this resulted in publicly expressed criticism of the economic reforms from the 
                                                             
45 In 1989, the Chinese government faced escalating student protests in Beijing and other cities. The regime cracked down 
hard, with tanks and soldiers from the People's Liberation Army. Estimates of the number of students, soldiers, and 
ordinary citizens are killed . 
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conservative faction of the CCP46. However, that did not deter the Chinese attempt at modern 
development. Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern tour and a series of his speeches in 199247 
reinvigorated the trend of further economic reform in China. He put forward some very 
encouraging notions at that time, which included, “to get rich is glorious” and “some areas 
must get rich before others”. From then on, the Chinese reform and open policy headed 
further and further away from the system of socialism and an economy based on public 
ownership.  
 
However, Deng did not intend to touch the heart of the Chinese’s socialist political structure. 
To uphold the legitimacy of the CCP's continued rule, Deng stressed time and again that there 
was no fundamental contradiction between socialism and a market economy, and that the 
Chinese reform was still being carried on under the Four Cardinal Principles48. The most 
important was not to discuss whether the road of the Chinese reform was capitalist or 
socialist, but rather to endeavor to develop the productive forces more effectively.    
 
Therefore, in order to promote Deng’s socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics, 
Mao became the weight for a balance between capitalism and socialism, even between the 
economic reforms and the political legitimacy of the CCP’s rule. After all, what Mao 
represents is the CCP’s glorious past and Mao’s Marxism with its Chinese characteristics, 
both of which laid the foundation of the Chinese Communist revolution.   
 
From the end of 1990, the official propaganda of Mao returned. With respect to the above 
official evaluation, this is a significant turning point in the media propaganda of Mao 
Zedong’s Thought.   
 
The shift of the official attitude to Mao was also shown by the example of the course of “Mao 
Zedong Thought” in Chinese tertiary education curriculum. Around the early 1980s, there 
was not a separate course in Mao Zedong Thoughts in the series of Ideological and Political 
Theory courses. At that time, Mao’s Thought was included in the course of “The history of 
                                                             
46 The most important representatives included Chenyun (陈云) and Li Xianlian（李先念）.  For more detailedinformation 
please refer to Zhao Suisheng’s article titled Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-Tiananmen China (Zhao, 
1993) 
47 In the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited several important cities in south of China, which included Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai. During his visit, he reasserted the importance of further economic reform in China.  
48 The principles are to keep to the socialist road and to uphold the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the 
Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. It was put forward on the Third Plenary Session of our 
Party's Eleventh Central Committee, in September, 1978. 
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the CCP” or “Modern History of China”. A separate course named “Outline of Mao Zedong 
Thought” came into being in 1998. However, in 2005, it was incorporated into a course of 
“An Introduction to Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the Important 
Thought of Three Represents”. Although the Deng Xiaoping Theory is the predominant 
characteristic in the evolution of Chinese political and ideological courses in Chinese tertiary 
education, Mao Zedong Thought and its contribution to the Chinese revolution have been the 
indispensible ruling foundation of the CCP. 
 
As long as Mao’s portrait is still hanging above Tiananmen Gate, no matter how economic 
reforms will be carried out, the direction of Chinese development will stick to socialism in 
the way that the CCP determines it. 
 
Mao’s Cult as Nostalgia  
Geremie R. Barmé, an Australian scholar of Chinese history, wrote a book titled “In the red: 
on contemporary Chinese culture”, in which he argued that the nascent Mao cult since the 
late 1980s was a certain kind of nostalgia (Barmé, 1999, p. 320). For him, as an original 
physical condition, nostalgia has evolved to be “a social interior dialogue regarding the 
irrevocable past, an identification with what is perceived as having been lost” (Barmé, 1999, 
p. 317). Therefore, as a kind of nostalgia, the new Mao’s cult mirrors the present real world.  
 
It is universally acknowledged that Chinese economic development has succeeded and 
modern markets have flourished as never before. Although economic reform still carries on 
under the government's macroeconomic controls, some unexpected negative effects have 
occurred while the government has been keeping economic development as its central task.  
 
As early as in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping said in one of his interviews that China’s economic 
reform will do well even if it might suffer from some negative influences from capitalism, 
and that he wouldn’t think that this was so terrible. For him, capitalism was superior to 
feudalism. Unfortunately, things seemed to have gone beyond his expectations. 
 
In order to adapt to this modern society, an influx of labourers from the countryside is 
flocking into big cities. At the same time, many workers from state-owned enterprises are 
laid-off and dumped onto the job market. These aggravate the pressures of getting 
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employment for graduates from universities and colleges.   
 
In a brutal competitive system, many people realize that the society does not provide a fair 
opportunity for them. Some officials and businessmen are getting richer through corruption 
and collusion with power. According to a research database, the number of corrupt cases in 
the 1990s were much higher than those of the 1980s, because the expanding economy gave 
officials opportunities to abuse their power49. But for common people, there is nowhere for 
them to express their resentment.  
 
The common people who live at the bottom of the social ladder find their lives more and 
more difficult. They find it increasingly difficult to afford the rising expenses of education, 
hospitals services and accommodation. An indisputable fact in this post-Mao Chinese modern 
society is that the gap between the rich and the poor has widened sharply. According to The 
Social Blue Book of 2008 published by The Chinese Academy of Social Science, China's Gini 
coefficient soared from 0.249 in 1982, to 0.47 in 2008. This far surpassed the internationally 
acknowledged maximum warning line of 0.4.  
 
It is no exaggeration to say that corruption was extremely rare in Mao’s era. At that time, 
cadres, particularly senior ones, and communist party members, all played an exemplary role 
in correctly exercising the power in their hands. They were honest and upright and even took 
the initiative to crack down on all forms of corruption. While the official counter-corruption 
movement often degenerated into the elimination of dissidents among the government 
officers, people are disappointed with the current system and have a strong involuntary 
feeling of nostalgia for Mao’s era.  
 
What’s more, the declining standard of social morals, bemoaned firstly by some intellectuals 
and the cultural elite, has become a common social phenomenon for the common people. 
This is exemplified in the recent food scandals. 
 
In recent years, Chinese media have exposed a variety of food safety incidents, such as “toxic 
milk”, “waste oil”, “fake beef”, “lean meat powder”, “staining bread” and so on. It seems that 
                                                             
49 The research titled "Characteristics and Development Trend Research on Chinese Senior Officials' Corruption" was carried 
out by Chinese National Conditions Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and Tsinghua University, and 
studied senior official corruption above vice-ministerial level over the past 20 years (1978-2002). (Source: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Jun/66715.htm) 
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no one know where the Chinese ethical and moral bottom line may be. These lamentable 
events, which demonstrate a serious lack of integrity in some enterprises, have aroused mass 
worry and panic about the foods people are consuming. Although the problem of food safety 
has become a daily concern for the people, they can do nothing about it, and believe that the 
reports in the media are only the tip of the iceberg.  
 
Furthermore, most people think that Chinese people are losing not only their ethical and 
moral standards, but also the national spirit the moral kingpin as advocated by Mao and 
which the nation relies on for survival and development.  
 
All of these negative impacts seriously affect the development of Chinese modernization. 
Despite the government’s promises to reverse this decay, the situation has not shown any 
improvment. When the nation lacks the transparency that democracy brings, it must lead to a 
lowering of the prestige of the CCP among the people. 
 
Accordingly, some common people blame it all on Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform and his 
thought, especially his viewpoint of letting some people get rich first. For them, the reforms 
and changes produce and intensify the injustice and inequality in society. They even consider 
that the emphasis of Mao and Mao’s thought by the present government is more rhetoric than 
a real inheritance of Mao’s spirit to “serve the people”.  
 
The people have begun to miss the simplicity and purity of Mao’s era, its sense of national 
pride and self-worth, the officers’ honesty and uprightness, and the spirit of whole-hearted 
service to the people. It is also reasonable to agree with Barmé’s argument that:  
 
As is so often the case when people face economic uncertainty and social 
anomies, old cultural symbols, cults, practices, and beliefs are spontaneously 
revived to provide a framework of cohesion and meaning for a threatening 
world. To many, Mao was representative of an age of certainty and confidence, 
of cultural and political unity, and, above all, of economic equality and 
incorruptibility (Barmé, 1999, p. 321). 
 
For most civilians who are discontented with their present situation, there is nowhere for 
them to express their resentment. Therefore, in such an atmosphere of nostalgia, they are apt 
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to seek spiritual solace by holding a memorial ceremony and even worshiping Mao.  
 
Overall, under the CCP’s current ambivalent policy of being neither for nor against Mao’s 
cult, various modes of it have revived as a response to the modernization in today’s China. 
Interestingly, originating from the absolute anti-religion environment of Mao’s era, Mao’s 
cult today has evolved into a modern mode of Chinese popular religion.   
 
Beside these obvious forms of religious worship, Mao’s cult is conflated with patriotism, the 
legitimacy of the CCP, and Chinese national cohesion. These non-religious Mao’s cults, 
whether originating from grass-roots initiation or government sponsorship, all manifest to 
Mao as a lasting, sacred and inviolable figure in the minds of Chinese people. The religious 
and non-religious Mao’s cults during the post-Mao reform have created, together with the 
legendary economic developments an alternative modernity that is both different from the 
western model of modernity and the traditional Chinese culture. 
 
Mao’s cult as Alternative modernity   
As outlined above, the interpretation of Mao’s cult and its implications are far beyond a 
political strategy for a power struggle between Mao and his opponents in the Party.  It is 
reasonable to position Mao and his cult as an embodiment of the history of the PRC and the 
CCP, as well as central to Chinese modernity.  
 
Modernity existed as one obsession for Mao’s new China, and Mao never stopped his effort 
in pursuing modernization.  However, as a consequence of the pervasiveness of traditional 
culture, Mao’s cult originated from the absolute anti-religious environment during the early 
period of modern China. The Cultural Revolution created a Shen” (God) in an atheist society, 
which endowed the early Mao’s modernization with traditional religious features. It was the 
existence of Mao’s cult that made Western scholars confused as to the nature of Mao’s way of 
modern development. However, as we mentioned in the Chapter One, the persistence of 
tradition in modernity under the leadership of the CCP does not disqualify it as a kind of 
modernity. It is rather an alternative modernity that has grown out of the Chinese soil, 
incorporating both western influence and the Chinese tradition. 
  
The revival of Mao’s cult in today’s China seems likely to reignite the doubt about the 
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Chinese modernity. Interestingly, Mao’s cult has became a new tradition and evolved into a 
modern mode of Chinese popular religion, as well as forming the core of a new patriotism, 
the ideology underlining the legitimacy of the CCP, and the mainstay of Chinese national 
cohesion. The revival of Mao’s cult in today’s China, no matter whether in the religious form 
or non-religious form, illustrates how Mao has become a necessary part of the CCP and build 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, independently and innovatively. 
 
China, as a non-Western country, has disengaged from the values of so-called normative 
modernity, which have evolved from the hegemonies of western ideology and cultures. The 
social phenomenon of Mao’s cult can be viewed as the reincarnation of tradition in the 
modernization of China, which creates a unique Chinese model of modern development --- an 
alternative modernity in China. 
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Conclusion 
It is necessary to distinguish tradition from modernity; however, the interactions and 
interweaving between modernity and tradition are also of profound significance. The 
persistence of tradition in modernity is not a passive phenomenon; it is rather an active one. 
Preserved tradition is interwoven with certain characteristics of modernity and then becomes 
so-called ‘created tradition’. Tradition, as an open system which includes and allows 
continuation and variation, leads to alternative modernities as a result of various 
transformations.   
 
There is no general trend toward a homogenous modernity, because cultural developments 
are not homogenous. The persistence of tradition and multiple cultures in today’s world 
manifests how the phenomenon of alternative modernity is one of the important traits in the 
development of the whole world. The western model might be not the best choice for non-
Western societies. It is impossible for non-western countries to either abandon their 
traditional culture to develop a whole new modernity, or to develop a homogenous modernity 
in accordance with western standards. 
 
In China, Mao Zedong was determined to construct a new modern China, and create a new 
world for the Chinese. It was inevitable that Mao’s new China, as a modern national state, 
would become modern. Externally, Mao continued the iconoclastic spirit of the May Fourth 
New Cultural Movement and advocated modern democracy. On the other hand, because of 
the well-established traditions in the minds of Chinese people (including the figure of Mao 
himself), Chinese modernization was different from the western version.  
 
Mao’s cult is typical of the Chinese manifestation of an alternative modernization. No matter 
how Mao acted out his own cult role, under the traditional religious or the non-religious form, 
he did so in order to realize radically modern and non-traditional values. Nevertheless, it 
would be falling into a “standard” western theoretical and conceptual framework to discuss 
“whether Mao’s cult is a religion”. It is better to focus on particular patterns of Chinese 
development and modernization. Even after Mao’s death, the phenomenon of Mao’s cult still 
exists in today’s China, no matter whether it is in a folk religious form or as a symbol of the 
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CCP’s orthodox values. 
 
Without Mao’s traditional monarchical consciousness, without other traditional and loyal 
revolutionaries around Mao, and without a social environment which promoted the traditional 
worship of authority and power, the rise and growth of Mao’s cult would have been 
inconceivable. Whereas, without the national spirit and cohesion demonstrated by Mao’s cult, 
Chinese modernization would have also been inconceivable. Furthermore, Mao and Mao’s 
thought, as a new tradition for China today, brought about a new form of Mao’s cult. That is 
to say, to a certain extent, the tradition itself was created in the context of modernity. 
Furthermore, modernity would be inconceivable without the “created” tradition.  
 
It is reasonable to argue that the existence of Mao’s cult is the consequence of the persistence 
of Chinese traditional culture in the modern context. To be more precise, Mao’s cult is an 
“other” or “alternative” modernity, rather than a pure modern social phenomenon, or simply a 
persistence of traditional culture. The complexity of the cult of Mao demonstrates that it 
should be understood in different ways regarding modernity and modernization, and that 
there are multiple models of development in accordance with the cultural diversity of the 
human world. 
 
Therefore, through the exploration of the phenomenon of Mao’s cult in China, it has been 
useful to identify the particular trait of China’s modernity and to summarize the basic 
findings: there is no point arguing the superiority of the western model of development by 
comparing western modernity with non-western modernity.  
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